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Chapter One. Setting the stage1
 
This is an essay about the concept of mental disorder, or more specifically, about how 
this concept should be defined (and why). This question can be formulated in several 
different ways, depending on in what broader category one thinks that the mental dis-
orders belong. For example, if one assumes (with Svensson 1990) that the mental disor-
ders belong to the broader class “abnormal behaviour and mental afflictions”, the ques-
tion is basically what (if any) abnormal behaviours and mental afflictions that should be 
classified as mental disorders, or alternatively, where we should draw the line between 
those abnormal behaviours (etc.) that are pathological, on the one hand, and those that 
are not, on the other. In a similar way, we can ask what (if any) “problems in living” that 
it is appropriate to view as mental disorders, and so on. 
   In this essay, I will conceive of the mental disorders as conditions rather than as, for 
example, behaviours, afflictions, or problems. The question can then be formulated as 
follows: What conditions (if any) should be categorized as mental disorders? I will also 
assume that mental disorders are disorders, i.e. that they belong to a wider category 
disorder (malady, or pathological condition), a category which also includes the somatic 
disorders. It can then be asked how we should draw the line between pathological and 
non-pathological conditions, and how we should distinguish those pathological condi-
tions that are mental from those that are physical or somatic. 
   A related question that I will also touch upon is the more radical question whether 
there should be a concept of mental disorder at all, or more specifically, whether it is 
appropriate or legitimate to categorize any conditions, afflictions (etc.) as mental disor-
ders, i.e. to group them together under a common heading in this way. Or as Svensson 
(1990) puts it, “[i]s it correct to conceptualize certain [any] abnormal behaviour and/or 
mental afflictions in terms of mental illness?” (p. 15) Are “mental illnesses” disease-type 
problems, on a par with somatic or “ordinary” disease-type problems? (ibid., p. 84)2 
And if the conditions that are currently classified as mental disorders should not (e.g. 
for some extra-theoretical reasons) be conceptualized in this way, how should they be 
conceptualized instead? 
   The main reason why this essay is about mental disorder rather than e.g. mental illness 
or mental disease is that the most practically relevant category is a broader category that 
                                                 
1 The work on this essay has been supported by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, in con-
nection with the project Relativism. I also want to thank Frank Lorentzon and Filip Radovic for having 
read and commented on chapter four. 
2 A closely related question is whether there any good reasons for viewing any mental afflictions as 
medical problems at all, e.g. as “problems that medicine as an art and science holds the legitimate ex-
pertise to deal with” (Svensson 1990, p. 123), problems that can or should be solved with medical
means, that belongs to the area of medical responsibility, or the like. 
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also includes injury, retardation, and so on.3 The practically important thing is obvi-
ously how we distinguish disorder from non-disorder, and not how we draw the line 
between e.g. disease and injury, or between illness and disease. For example, it seems 
plausible to argue that people who suffer from disorders are entitled to health care 
whereas people who do not suffer from disorders are not, but it would be strange to ar-
gue that people who suffer from diseases are entitled to health care whereas people who 
suffer from e.g. illnesses or injuries are not. It is not just of little or no practical im-
portance how we distinguish e.g. disease from injury, distinctions like these also seem 
rather arbitrary. 
   Before we look at how these questions might be answered (in chapters two, three, and 
four), let us first ask ourselves whether it is important how these questions are an-
swered, and if so, why. Why should we care about how the concept of mental disorder 
is defined? In relation to this question, there will also be a brief discussion of the more 
radical question whether we should have a concept of mental disorder at all. When we 
have looked at the possible purposes of a definition, it is time to shift our attention to the 
question of what constitutes a good definition, i.e. what criteria we should use for as-
sessing different tentative definitions of mental disorder. 
 
What’s the point? Some possible purposes of a definition  
Is it important to arrive at a well-founded definition of “mental disorder”, and if so, 
why? What is the point, why should we care about how the concept of mental disorder 
is defined? What purposes do we want the concept to serve? 
   It is not likely that we need such a definition for any theoretical or scientific purposes. 
For example, we don’t need a well-founded definition of “mental disorder” to arrive at a 
more correct view of the world, i.e. mental disorder is no natural kind, and it is highly 
unlikely that there is such a thing as a true definition of the concept (cf. the section on 
constructionism  on pp. 42-43 below). Or alternatively put, there is little or no reason to 
believe that any of the medical sciences have any need for a category of mental disorder, 
i.e. that such a concept belongs in any mature explanatory scientific theory about any-
thing, e.g. in the way some diagnostic categories seem to do.  
   Not everyone agrees with this “anti-theoretical” idea, however. For example, Murphy 
and Woolfolk seem to believe that we need a concept of mental disorder in scientific 
contexts (cf. Murphy and Woolfolk 2000b, p. 290). Or more specifically, they seem to 
                                                 
3 As Culver and Gert (1982) observe, “[i]t would be very useful to have a general term which includes
disease, illness, injury, headache, allergy, and so on. We believe that all illnesses, injuries, diseases,
headaches, hernias, and even asymptomatic allergies do have something in common. We propose ‘mal-
ady’ as the general term that includes them all.” (p. 66) They also add that by “malady”, they mean
roughly “any condition in which there is something wrong with the person” (ibid., p. 66). In this essay,
I will use the term “disorder” instead of “malady”.
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believe that a concept of mental disorder should provide a way of integrating research 
on psychopathology into other sciences of the mind, and to further our understanding 
of phenomena labelled pathological (Murphy and Woolfolk 2000a, p. 242). They don’t 
tell us how this is supposed to happen, however, so there is really no reason why we 
should accept the view that it is a purpose of a definition to contribute to better expla-
nations. As Wakefield (2000b) points out, direct substantive scientific payoff is not the 
function of a conceptual analysis (p. 268). 
   Another possible theoretical purpose of a definition is that it should help us construct 
better classifications. For example, Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) claim that a concept of 
mental disorder should produce a parsimonious and consistent nosology, that it should 
underlie a heuristically fruitful taxonomy of mental disorders (p. 242), and Wakefield 
(1992) argues that a “correct understanding of the concept [of disorder] is essential for 
constructing ‘conceptually valid’ […] diagnostic criteria that are good discriminators 
between disorder and nondisorder” (pp. 373-374). But how is a definition of “mental 
disorder” supposed to help us construct a valid or fruitful taxonomy of mental disor-
ders, apart from the trivial idea that it can help us determine what conditions should be 
included in such a taxonomy? In my view, it seems clear that a definition of “mental 
disorder” cannot help us distinguish different disorders from each other, i.e. to draw 
lines within the category of mental disorder. However, in those cases where there is a 
fuzzy boundary or graded transition between some disorder (e.g. a personality disor-
der) and some “normal” condition (cf. pp. 20-21 below), a definition of “mental disor-
der” may well help us to distinguish between the two. It is highly doubtful whether 
such (somewhat arbitrary) distinctions between the pathological and the “normal” have 
any explanatory value, however, i.e. whether the diagnostic categories arrived at in this 
way belong in any explanatory theory. 
   To conclude, we should reject the idea that a conceptual analysis can and should be 
scientifically useful (directly or indirectly). This is not to deny that the phrase “mental 
disorder” may well be indispensable in some of the medical humanities (like history of 
medicine or medical anthropology), where e.g. our cultural beliefs about mental disor-
der are sometimes made objects of study. It is hardly necessary to give a plausible defi-
nition of the concept to engage in this kind of endeavour, however. 
   The alternative view is that if it has any purpose at all to define “mental disorder”, 
then this purpose is practical. This view is based on the observation that it has important 
practical consequences how the concept is defined, primarily for the people who are 
classified as disordered. We all have a lot of normative and other beliefs about mental 
disorder, e.g. beliefs about how different disorders are most effectively treated, how one 
should relate to people with mental disorders, and so on, and these beliefs influence our 
attitudes and actions in a number of ways. Moreover, there are a substantial number of 
laws and regulations which contain the concept of mental disorder, and which have im-
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portant practical consequences. In short, it makes a difference how the concept is de-
fined.4
   The primary practical purpose of a definition is that it should help us make better de-
cisions, e.g. about who is entitled to publicly funded health care or to sick leave with 
compensation. What we ask for in this case is a definition that makes certain reasonable 
norms and regulations (e.g. that the severely mentally ill has a right to health care) as 
reasonable as possible. This is not the only way in which a definition can (if accepted) 
make a difference, however. Its effects can also be mediated by dubious norms and be-
liefs, e.g. that the mentally ill are not fully human, or that they have less rights than the 
rest of us. It might be argued that the practical purposes of a definition should somehow 
take this type of case into account as well, e.g. that we should define the concept of men-
tal disorder in such a way that it helps make the world a better place (if accepted), even 
in those cases when the definition affects people by being incorporated into implausible 
norms and regulations. As we will soon see, it is far from certain that this wish can be 
fulfilled, however. 
   In any case, for the time being, we can (depending on whether the relevant norms are 
reasonable or not) distinguish between two kinds of practical purposes of a definition. 
Let us first look at the first type of practical purpose, i.e. the cases where a definition 
might help us make better decisions, viz. by making certain (already) reasonable norms 
and regulations as reasonable as possible. 
 
A list of possible practical purposes (related to plausible norms) 
If the primary practical purpose of a definition is that it should (ideally) help us make 
better decisions, we first have to ask ourselves what kinds of decisions a definition can 
possibly help us make. Or alternatively put, what types of normative problems can a 
definition of “mental disorder” help us solve, and what plausible beliefs are there that 
contain an implicit or explicit reference to mental disorder? Here is a list of practical 
problems where a well-founded definition might offer some guidance, i.e. a list of dif-
ferent ways in which a definition might be of normative relevance. 
 
1. A definition might help us decide who is entitled to publicly funded health care or 
medical insurance reimbursement. For example, we tend to believe that people with 
mental disorders have (at least when the disorder is severe enough) rights to special 
mental health services, rights which they would not have if they were “merely dis-
tressed”. This suggests that a definition of “mental disorder” might help us determine 
                                                 
4 It has been pointed out to me by Eve Garrard (in conversation) that there might be other good reasons 
for wanting a well-founded definition, i.e. reasons that are neither scientific nor practical. For example,
we might (somehow) need a plausible concept of disorder to orient ourselves in the world. I will not in-
vestigate this possibility any further in this essay, however. 
 4
what services there should be for people who suffer from a certain condition, or whether 
a certain individual should be denied insurance benefits for mental health services. A 
well-founded definition cannot settle these questions all by itself, however. To have a 
disorder may well be necessary for health care, but it is hardly sufficient. 
 
 2. A definition should (ideally) help us determine who is entitled to sick leave with 
compensation. In many countries, people with mental or other disorders have a right to 
compensation for their “mental injuries”, a right that they would not have if they were 
not disordered. This suggests that a definition might help us determine what compen-
sation arrangements there should be for people who suffer from a certain condition. The 
presence of a disorder is not sufficient for compensation, however, e.g. in the Swedish 
case, it is also necessary that the disorder has a detrimental effect on one's ability to 
work.5
 
3. It might be argued that a definition of “mental disorder” might help us settle certain 
normative (legal) issues in forensic psychiatry, e.g. that it should help us determine 
what criminals should be sentenced to psychiatric care rather than to prison (in the 
Swedish system), or what criminals that should be legally excused from criminal re-
sponsibility (e.g. in almost all European countries). 
   Sometimes people commit crimes influenced by mental illness (or better: while in a 
condition commonly regarded as a mental disorder). Different societies react to these 
people in different ways. For example, in most countries (e.g. all European countries 
except Sweden), what Tännsjö (1999) calls the Excuse Model has been adopted. In these 
countries, mentally disordered criminals are sometimes legally excused, i.e. they are re-
garded as not guilty, and thus not punished for what they did. However, this does not 
mean that these people cannot be detained or subjected to coercive psychiatric treatment 
on other grounds. In Sweden (where “the Mixed Model” has been adopted), these peo-
ple are never legally excused. Instead, they are sometimes sentenced to psychiatric 
treatment (as a form of punishment). 
   Now, this obviously gives rise to the more general question of how society should react 
to these people, i.e. what general model that is most appropriate. Is it the Excuse Model, 
the Mixed Model, or what Tännsjö (1999) calls the Full Responsibility Model? It is highly 
unlikely that a definition of “mental disorder” can help us settle this question, however, 
i.e. that it can help us determine what type of model that is most appropriate. 
   However, there are also a number of more specific questions that arise given that a cer-
tain model is accepted. For example, if the Excuse Model is accepted, we have to ask (a) 
when (under what conditions) a person should be legally excused, and (b) when he 
should be detained or given compulsory treatment. And if the Mixed Model is accepted, 
                                                 
5 In reality, the presence of a disorder isn't even necessary for compensation, since people are some-
times “sick-listed” due to bereavement or other personal crises.
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we have to ask (c) when a person should be sentenced to psychiatric treatment. So, can a 
definition of mental disorder help us answer any of these questions, and if so, how can a 
definition be of help?6
   (a) On the Excuse Model, the presence of mental disorder is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for the person to be legally excused. The reason why it is not necessary is that 
there are other conditions (e.g. dementia or mental retardation) that have a similar 
status. The reason why it is not sufficient is that there are a number of other criteria that 
also must be satisfied, e.g. the disorder must have as a consequence that the agent did 
not know or understand what he was doing, that he did not know that what he was do-
ing is wrong or illegal, or that he could not help doing what he did (that he could not 
control his acts). It is therefore somewhat doubtful to what extent, if any, a definition of 
“mental disorder” can help us determine when someone should be legally excused. 
   (b) Can a definition of mental disorder help a proponent of the Excuse Model to de-
termine when a ”criminal” should be detained or given compulsory psychiatric treat-
ment? In this case, mental disorder is certainly a necessary condition for detainment (etc), 
and it might therefore be of some relevance how the concept is defined. Again, it is far 
from sufficient, however. A number of other criteria must also be satisfied, e.g. the per-
son must be dangerous to himself or others, or the condition must be possible to treat (in 
the UK). It is therefore unclear to what extent a definition of mental disorder can help us 
determine when compulsory treatment is appropriate in the forensic case. 
   (c) Let us now assume that the Mixed (Swedish) Model is accepted. In this case, can a 
definition of mental disorder help us determine when (under what conditions) a person 
should be sentenced to psychiatric treatment rather than to prison? Well, the presence of 
a mental disorder certainly constitutes a necessary condition for such a punishment, but 
again, the mere presence of a mental disorder is far from sufficient. A number of other 
criteria must also be satisfied, e.g. the mental disorder must be serious, and the person 
must be dangerous to others. It is therefore somewhat doubtful whether a definition of 
mental disorder can help us determine when this form of punishment is appropriate. 
   So far, I have assumed that we can get little normative guidance from a definition if 
the presence of a mental disorder is “merely” a necessary condition for e.g. compulsory 
treatment. But is this really the case? Are there no examples of conditions which satisfy 
the other relevant criteria (e.g. where the person is confused, has difficulty in controlling 
his acts, is dangerous, etc), but where there is disagreement on whether the condition is 
a mental disorder? In fact, there seems to exist at least one such case, e.g. the case of anti-
social personality disorder (psychopathy). Some people (preferably men) who are cate-
gorized in this way are obviously potentially dangerous, and this is partly due to the 
fact that they sometimes have great difficulty to control their impulses. But are they 
”mentally ill”? How this question is answered clearly has important consequences. 
                                                 
6 It is worth pointing out that on some views, e.g. like Tännsjö’s Full Responsibility Model, the ques-
tion who is mentally ill or not does not arise at all. 
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   To conclude, it is, in most cases, of little relevance to normative issues in forensic psy-
chiatry how the concept of mental disorder is defined, and it is doubtful whether this 
”purpose” can help us choose between competing definitions. There is one possible ex-
ception, however, viz. it is clearly of practical importance whether we regard so-called 
personality disorders as mental disorders. 
 
4. Another possible purpose of a definition is that it might help us to determine when a 
mentally ill person might be detained or subjected to psychiatric treatment against her 
will, e.g. whether a certain individual should be involuntary committed to a mental in-
stitution. Sometimes, mentally ill people (or better: people who are regarded as mentally 
ill) are compulsorily admitted and subjected to coercive psychiatric treatment. This 
gives rise to several questions, e.g. when, if ever, involuntary hospitalisation is appro-
priate. Can a definition of mental disorder help us answer this question, i.e. help us de-
cide when compulsory treatment is appropriate? And if so, how can a definition be of 
help? 
   The presence of a mental disorder is certainly necessary for coercive psychiatric care, 
and it might therefore be of some relevance how the concept is defined. It is far from 
sufficient, however, i.e. a number of other criteria must also be satisfied, e.g. the mental 
disorder must be of a serious nature, there must be a need for treatment, the person 
must (because of his condition) be dangerous to self or others, or the person must be 
incompetent, i.e. incapable of making an autonomous decision about the treatment. 
   So again, we have to ask whether we can get any normative guidance from a definition 
if the presence of a mental disorder is “merely” necessary for compulsory treatment. 
And again, the central issue seems to be whether there are any conditions that satisfy 
other relevant criteria (e.g. where the person is dangerous, etc), but where there is at 
least some disagreement on whether the condition is a mental disorder. In fact, there 
seems to be at least one case, viz. ”severe personality disorder” (including ”psycho-
pathy”). Consider the following proposal. In 1999, “the UK government made it clear 
that it intended to introduce legislation in England and Wales for the compulsory and 
potentially indefinite detention of people with what is called ’dangerous severe person-
ality disorder’, whether or not they had been convicted of a serious criminal offence.” 
(Kendell 2002, p. 110) This proposal seems to assume that personality disorders should 
be regarded as mental disorders. One reason for this is that the UK has incorporated the 
European Convention of Human Rights into its legislation. This convention ”prohibits 
the detention of anyone who has not been convicted by a competent court unless they 
are ’of unsound mind’” (ibid., p. 110). And as Kendell points out, this means that ”the 
Government will have to argue that the potentially dangerous men it wishes to incar-
cerate are ’of unsound mind’, and this means maintaining that they have personality 
disorders, and that personality disorders are mental disorders” (ibid., p. 110). 
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   To conclude, it is somewhat doubtful whether a definition of mental disorder can help 
us determine when compulsory treatment (or preventive detention) is appropriate. 
There is one possible exception, however, viz. it seems to be of importance, at least in 
the UK, whether or not the so-called personality disorders are regarded as mental dis-
orders. 
 
5. It can also be argued that a definition of “mental disorder” should help us specify the 
goals of medicine in general, and the goals of psychiatry in particular. Most of us believe 
that one of the central goals of the medical enterprise (and the health care system) is to 
cure or prevent diseases and other disorders, or to help “the sick” in other ways (e.g. by 
relieving their suffering). Or alternatively put, we normally think of disorders as condi-
tions that require medical intervention, and for which medical intervention is appropri-
ate. As Kendell (2002) points out, it seems reasonable to suggest that to regard a condi-
tion as a disorder has something to do with 
if it seems on balance that physicians (or health professionals in general) and their 
technologies are more likely to be able to deal with it effectively than any of the po-
tential alternatives, such as the criminal justice system (treating it as a crime), the 
church (treating it as a sin) or social work (treating it as a social problem). (p. 112)7
 
In short, there is an intimate connection between being a disorder and being a condition 
that health professionals treat or should treat (cf. Wilkinson 2000). Mental disorders are 
of course no exceptions in this regard. 
   This suggests that a well-founded definition of “mental disorder” can help us specify 
the goals of medicine in general and the goals of psychiatry in particular. This idea is 
closely related to Wakefield’s (1992) idea that a “correct” definition can help us “[a]t an 
institutional level, [to demarcate] […] the special responsibilities of mental health pro-
fessionals from those of other professionals such as criminal justice lawyers, teachers, 
and social welfare workers”, and that it can (in this way) help us settle jurisdictional 
disputes (p. 373).  
   However, it is worth noting that there is no necessary connection between a condi-
tion’s being a disorder and its requiring medical intervention (cf. Wilkinson 2000). For 
example, psychiatry has other legitimate goals besides the goal of treating or preventing 
mental disorders, and it is far from certain that medical intervention is the most appro-
priate response to all disorders. 
 
                                                 
7 Kendell also observes that if an apparently effective treatment is introduced for a certain condition,
this can produce a decisive change in medical opinion. If a condition responds to a treatment that is not 
simply a disciplined environment, it is likely that it will (in fact) be regarded as a disorder (Kendell 
2002, p 114). This is as likely in the mental case as it is in the somatic case: ”The introduction of effec-
tive treatments would probably have a decisive influence on psychiatrists’ attitudes” (ibid., p. 114).
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6. It might also be argued that a good definition of “mental disorder” might help us re-
late to people with problems in more appropriate ways. For example, we tend to believe 
that sick people are sometimes entitled to sympathy and support, and that illness might 
constitute a valid excuse for normally criticisable behaviour.8 This suggests that a defi-
nition should (ideally) help us decide who is (so to speak) “entitled” to more support 
than the average person and when it is appropriate to excuse or tolerate people for what 
they do. However, this is not to say that the presence of a mental disorder is in any way 
sufficient for special treatment (it is also important how the person is diagnosed), or that 
people cannot be entitled to special treatment on other grounds. 
 
Some more possible practical purposes 
Apart from the rather obvious idea that a definition should ideally (if commonly ac-
cepted) improve or facilitate communication between different groups and individuals 
(by establishing a common language), the remaining practical purposes can all be re-
garded as versions of the more general idea that the concept of mental disorder should 
(ideally) be defined in a way that makes the world a better place, e.g. in a way which 
reduces the negative consequences that are sometimes associated with being labelled as 
mentally ill. 
   We have already seen how a definition can make the world better by helping us to 
make better decisions. However, we have also indicated (on p. 4 above) that there are 
other ways in which a definition can (if accepted) affect the world. For example, a defi-
nition of “mental disorder” can affect people by being incorporated into implausible 
norms and regulations, e.g. the idea that the mentally ill do not have the same rights as 
others, or that they are not entitled to the same respect as others. That we draw the line 
between mental disorders and other problems in a certain place can also have a number 
of unintended side effects, regardless of whether the definition is incorporated into 
plausible or implausible norms and regulations, e.g. what conditions we regard as men-
tal disorders can affect the large-scale distribution of resources in different ways. 
   Now, here is a list of possible consequences of how we draw the line between mental 
disorders and other conditions, consequences that are either more or less unintended or 
mediated by implausible norms and regulations. 
   The most immediate consequence of how we define “mental disorder” is of course 
who is classified as mentally disordered, and how many. This gives rise to further ef-
fects. First, that a certain person is classified as e.g. mentally ill (as opposed to “trou-
bled”, “afflicted”, “mad” or “different”) can benefit or harm the person thus classified in 
different ways, but it can also bring advantages or disadvantages to the person's rela-
                                                 
8 The idea that illness can constitute an excuse can partly be explained by Reznek’s suggestion that dis-
eases are, by definition, involuntary conditions which cannot be eliminated by a decision, and that we 
are (therefore) not immediately responsible for our disorders.
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tives. And second, what conditions are regarded as mental disorders can also have 
large-scale social effects, e.g. depending on how large a part of the population that is 
classified as suffering from a mental disorder. 
   To be classified as somatically ill or sick is sometimes associated with certain benefits 
on the interpersonal level, e.g. support and sympathy from friends and relatives. Many 
benefits of this type are not consequences of being classified as ill as such, however, but 
(rather) consequences of getting a specific diagnosis, or of getting some diagnosis or 
other. For example, to get a diagnosis can sometimes mean that one’s suffering is so-
cially recognized and accepted, the world might become a more orderly place, and so 
on.9 However, it is doubtful whether these benefits are as extensive in the case of mental 
disorder as they are in the case of somatic disorder. It is true that we probably give men-
tally ill people some support and sympathy, and that they are more easily excused from 
responsibility than others, but in the case of mental disorder, it is not unlikely that the 
harms outweigh the benefits (at least on the interpersonal level). For example, people 
who suffer from a mental disorder (as such) are often stigmatized, especially people 
who suffer from classical mental illnesses like schizophrenia.10 The stigma that is asso-
ciated with certain disorders can take different forms, e.g. “intrapsychologically”, it can 
take the form of shame, “interpersonally”, it can take the form of harassment or social 
exclusion, and “institutionally”, it can take the form of discrimination.11
   How we draw the line between mental disorders and other “human problems” also 
has a number of large-scale social effects. For example, how large a part of the popula-
tion that is categorized as mentally disturbed has an effect on how much we spend on 
e.g. psychiatric care, compensation, and medical research.12 Group interests are also af-
fected by how “mental disorder” is defined, e.g. a broader notion of mental disorder 
will probably give more power and income to the various mental health professions. 
(The more problems that are included in its area of expertise, the higher the power and 
                                                 
9 That someone gets a certain diagnosis can also be beneficial to relatives, e.g. it can be beneficial to 
parents if their troubled child is given a diagnosis like ADHD. The reason for this is partly that it opens 
up for a somatic explanation (“It wasn’t our fault after all!”), and partly that the child gains access to 
extra resources e.g. in school. I don’t think this phenomenon is very common in the mental disorder 
area, however.
10 At this point, it is worth noting that conditions that are classified as mental disorders may well be as-
sociated with stigma for other reasons than that they are classified in this way. For example, we would
most probably not remove the stigma associated with pedophilia if we stopped classifying it as a disor-
der.
11 As we have seen above, there are other possible “harms” besides stigmatizarion that are associated 
with being categorized as mentally ill or getting a psychiatric diagnosis, e.g. that it makes involuntary
detainment and compulsory treatment possible. 
12 To simply medicalize certain conditions (i.e. to regard them as medical problems) might have similar
effects, regardless of whether or not this medicalization is accompanied by pathologization (i.e. that the
problem is not just regarded as a medical problem, but also as a pathological condition, i.e. as a dis-
order).
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status of psychiatry.)13 And if such a broad concept is connected with the idea that the 
causes of mental disorders are mainly biological, then the pharmaceutical industry will 
most probably benefit as well. 
   Another large-scale social consequence is related to the norm setting and controlling 
function of medicine that Foucault and others have written about. Medical sociologists 
often think of medicine as a powerful institution of “social control”. This is a much 
stronger claim than the rather trivial idea that the medical professions exercise medical 
control, and that the pathologization or medicalization of conditions like pregnancy or 
alcoholism gives rise to medical supervision, monitoring and surveillance, on the one 
hand, and medical regulation and intervention, on the other. After all, we normally 
think of disorders as conditions that require medical intervention, and for which medi-
cal intervention is appropriate (see point 5 on p. 8 above). The idea that medicine oper-
ates as an institution of social control seems to include the further claim that the purpose 
or function of medical interventions is not just to benefit people (e.g. by curing or pre-
venting diseases), but also to “reinforce existing social structures” or to maintain “tradi-
tional social values”. A standard of normality is established and imposed, and this does 
not just affect the people who are corrected, but may also have a regulatory and disci-
plinary effect on the rest of us. 
   In this context, it is not really necessary to take a stand on whether “the real function” 
of medicalized discourse is that society (or some powerful group) can control certain 
individuals. Nor do we have to know whether this controlling function explains why 
the concept of mental illness was once introduced. We don’t have to adopt such con-
spiratorial views in order to accept the idea that pathologization or medicalization can 
have these effects (intended or not), i.e. that it can make people more dependent on 
medical expertise, and that it can set or reinforce certain standards of normality that 
might, in turn, “reinforce existing social structures”. 
   In short, there are at least three (salient) types of possible harms that are somehow as-
sociated with (e.g. dependent on) how “mental disorder” is defined. First, people who 
are classified as mentally disordered are sometimes stigmatized as a result. Second, the 
number of conditions included in the category of mental disorder has an effect on how 
powerful the mental health professions (and the pharmaceutical industry) are, and to 
what extent people rely on medical expertise rather than e.g. on themselves. And third, 
ascriptions of mental illness have sometimes been used for purposes of social control, 
                                                 
13 A favorite example among medical sociologists is the case of pregnancy and childbirth. When these 
phenomena came to be treated as medical problems in need of “medical regulation and supervision”,
this made the doctors (the new experts) more powerful, whereas other groups became more powerless
and helpless as a result. The midwives became subordinate, and the pregnant women became more de-
pendent on medical expertise, which (supposedly) made them more helpless, viz. by stripping them of
the ability to cope with their own problems (cf. Nettleton 1995). 
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e.g. to justify the use of medical power to impose certain standards of normality, viz. by 
intervening in socially disapproved behaviour. 
   So, do these possible harms have anything to do with the purposes of defining the 
concept of mental disorder? Well, it might be argued that these possible consequences 
should somehow be taken into account when defining the concept, or more specifically, 
that we should define the concept in a way that minimizes these harms. For example, 
one might argue that the concept of mental disorder should be defined in a way that 
makes abuse of psychotropic medication and involuntary confinement more difficult (cf. 
Wakefield 2000a, p. 41), or that we should have a concept of disorder that cannot be ma-
nipulated by the authorities (cf. Szasz 2000). 
   Is this a plausible view? For example, to what extent (if any) should we take the possi-
bility of stigmatization into account when we define the concept of mental disorder? Let 
us first investigate whether there is any truth in the most extreme version of the “harm 
minimization view”, viz. the idea that “[f]or any type of condition X, X is a disorder only 
if classifying it as a disorder has no significantly harmful effects” (Wilkinson 2000, p. 
298).14
   Wilkinson (2000) argues convincingly that this is an implausible view. He asks us to 
imagine a world in which there is a widespread extreme and irrational fear of others’ ill-
health, coupled with the false belief that all unhealthy states are highly infectious. In this 
world, the standard practice for dealing with illness is to kill those who are ill by burn-
ing them, thereby (it is believed) destroying the relevant infection and preventing it 
from spreading. In this world, classifying a condition as a disorder will almost always 
significantly harm people with that condition (by causing them to be killed). This does 
not mean that there are almost no disorders in this world, however (p. 298). 
   From this, Wilkinson concludes that “[w]hether a condition is a disorder or not does 
not depend on what consequences classifying it as a disorder would have for those with 
that condition.” (p. 299) However, it can objected that this sort of moral consideration 
has at least some relevance to the issue of whether or not a certain condition should be 
classified as a disorder.15
 
The sceptical view: “there is no point!” 
This concludes the section on why and how it might be of (practical) importance how 
the concept of mental disorder is defined. Not everyone thinks that it is important how 
we define this concept, however, so let us now look at the idea that we have little or no 
reason to care about how we define the concept of disorder. Is this a plausible claim? 
                                                 
14 Wilkinson attributes this view to Kopelman. 
15 For example, it seems plausible to argue that part of the reason why we should avoid a purely
evaluative concept of disorder is that such a concept would make it too easy for the authorities to justify 
the use (or abuse) of medical power. 
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The strongest argument that can be given to support this sceptical claim is probably the 
following three-step argument: 
 
(1) The only possible reason why it might be important how we define “mental disor-
der” is that a well-founded definition can help us make better decisions, e.g. about who 
is entitled to health care or compensation. That is, we don’t need such a definition for 
theoretical or scientific purposes (cf. pp. 2-3 above), and we can ignore those effects of a 
definition that are unintended or mediated by implausible norms (cf. Wilkinson’s posi-
tion on p. 12 above).  
 
(2) The concept of mental disorder can never do this normative job alone, however. For 
example, a person is not entitled to publicly funded health care or compensation merely 
because he suffers from a mental disorder, and a person cannot be sentenced to compul-
sory psychiatric treatment merely because he committed a crime under the influence of a 
mental disorder. No matter what practical question we have in mind, other conditions 
must also be satisfied, e.g. the disorder has to be severe enough, the person must be un-
able to work, the person must be dangerous to others, or the like (cf. pp. 4-9 above). 
 
(3) This suggests that we might as well attack the relevant normative questions directly, 
without using the concept of mental disorder at all. As Wilkinson (2000) suggests, “an-
swers to questions such as ‘What services, or compensation arrangements, should there 
be for grieving people?’ ought not to be determined by the health status of grief, but 
rather by the needs and the suffering of grieving people.” (p. 304) That is, if we want to 
decide whether people with a certain condition are entitled to health care or not, it is not 
really necessary to determine whether or not the condition is a disorder. Instead, we 
should focus on the relevant empirical questions, e.g. how much suffering or disability 
that is associated with the condition, to what extent it responds to medical interventions, 
and so on (cf. also Malmgren 1984). The idea that we don’t really need a definition of 
“mental disorder” to make good decisions can also be formulated as follows: There are 
no plausible normative beliefs which contain an essential reference to the concept of 
disorder, i.e. none of the “plausible normative beliefs” mentioned on pp. 4-9 above are 
really (or maximally) plausible. 
   To give further support to (3), it might also be argued that it is positively misleading 
(that it might even be harmful) to believe that we can find a single concept of mental 
disorder that will help us deal with all the different practical questions on pp. 4-9. On 
this view, there is no single definition of “mental disorder” that fits all practical pur-
poses listed above, e.g. that can both help us decide who is entitled to health care and 
who should be excused from criminal responsibility. 
 
This is a good argument, but it can still be argued that it is practically important how the 
concept of mental disorder is defined. First, it is not likely that we can do without con-
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cepts like “disease”, “health” or “mental disorder” in all normative contexts. For exam-
ple, the goals of medicine can to a large extent be formulated in terms of e.g. well-being, 
suffering, life expectancy, disability and functioning. But to determine e.g. what kind of 
well-being and functioning that should be promoted, it seems necessary refer to con-
cepts like “health” and “disease”, viz. because it is e.g. health-related and/or disease-
related functioning that medicine ought to promote. Second, it is important to consider 
that concepts like “disease”, “illness”, and “injury” are deeply rooted in our culture, and 
that people think, feel and act in these terms. This suggests that we should not ignore 
those effects of a definition that are e.g. unintended or mediated by implausible norms, 
as it is assumed in step (1) above. It is not impossible that we would do better without 
these concepts, e.g. that we should abolish the concept of mental disorder totally (like 
Szasz suggests), but since such a revolutionary conceptual change is not very likely to 
happen, the best thing we can do is probably to settle for reforms, i.e. to try to influence 
things for the better by providing better definitions. 
 
Should there be a concept of mental disorder at all? 
Some of the practical purposes listed above suggest that we might have good reasons to 
adopt a rather narrow or restrictive definition, e.g. that we should define the concept in 
such a way so as to minimize stigma or other harmful effects. This might, in turn, give 
rise to the idea that we should not just make the class of mental disorder rather narrow, 
but that we should make it totally empty, i.e. that we should reject the concept alto-
gether. On this radical view, it is always inappropriate and illegitimate to pathologize 
people’s “abnormal behaviour and mental afflictions”, i.e. to categorize them as mental 
disorders. This idea is often accompanied by an even stronger claim, viz. that we 
shouldn’t even medicalize these conditions, i.e. view them as medical problems. So, 
what’s the alternative? If we must not view a certain behaviour or affliction as a disor-
der or medical problem, how should we view it instead? Here, it is likely that the pro-
ponents of the radical view want us to conceive of the relevant conditions as “social 
problems”, “problems in living”, or “deviations from social norms” rather than, for ex-
ample, in terms of madness, crime, sin, or obsession. 
   Is this a plausible view, or should we stick to the idea that there should be a concept of 
mental disorder, i.e. that we have good reasons to conceptualize at least some afflictions 
and behaviours as mental disorders rather than as, say, “problems in living”? 
   Let us first see whether there are any conceptual considerations that can help us decide 
between the two views. First, we can safely ignore the fact that we actually use the 
phrase “mental disorder” in our everyday speech. The fact that we actually classify cer-
tain conditions as mental disorders does not imply that we ought to do so. This does not 
mean that all conceptual reasons are irrelevant, however. As Svensson (1990) suggests, 
“it is through showing that phenomena called mental illnesses are sufficiently alike bod-
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ily illnesses (or that they are not) that one can sustain (or refute) the reasonableness of 
the concept of mental illness.” (p. 18)16 In my view, there are at least some mental afflic-
tions that are sufficiently like somatic disorders to be classified as mental disorders (e.g. 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder), i.e. Svensson’s conceptual postulate seems to sup-
port the common view rather than the radical view. 
   The next question is whether there are any “theoretical” considerations that can help us 
decide between the two views. For example, are there any conditions that are best con-
ceived of as mental disorders (medical problems) for theoretical reasons, i.e. because this 
contributes to our understanding of these conditions, or because it helps us to explain 
these conditions? It is tempting to give an affirmative answer to this question, e.g. be-
cause there seem to be at least some mental afflictions that are best explained in bio-
chemical terms. However, if a condition can be explained in this way, it is doubtful 
whether it can still be regarded as a genuine mental disorder (cf. e.g. p. 47 below). If we 
restrict ourselves to those disturbing conditions that need to be explained in mental 
rather than biological terms, it is far from certain classifying these conditions as disor-
ders helps us understand them any better.17 As far as I can tell, there may well be a large 
number of conditions that are better understood and explained if they are not conceptu-
alized in medical terms. In short, it seems that “theoretical” considerations of this kind 
cannot really help us decide between the common view and the radical view.18
   There are also a rather large number of practical considerations that are of relevance in 
this context. These considerations are all reflections on what consequences it has to cate-
gorize e.g. our “mental afflictions and abnormal behaviours” as mental disorders rather 
than as e.g. “problems in living”, and whether it would have better consequences if these 
conditions were (instead) categorized in some other way, e.g. as social problems, crimes 
or sins. Now, most of these consequences are already implicit in the list of possible prac-
tical purposes of a definition (cf. pp. 4-12 above), so to avoid repetition I’ll just offer a 
brief list designed for this slightly different purpose. 
   If certain conditions are conceptualized as mental disorders, the most immediate effect 
is that the people who suffer from these conditions will be categorized as mentally ill or 
disordered. This can be both beneficial and harmful for the people thus classified. First, 
there are a number of apparent benefits associated with this label, e.g. the person might 
be entitled to publicly funded health care, reimbursement or compensation, and he 
might reap some of the advantages that are associated with the sick role, like support 
                                                 
16 He also points out that this “comparison postulate” (as he calls it) is based on “the notion that the
concept of  ‘ordinary’ or bodily illness is the more basic, the paradigmatic and the far more well-
entrenched concept” (ibid.). 
17 This is not to say that most conditions that are currently classified as mental disorders are best un-
derstood in psychological terms, however. 
18 In my view, this somewhat “neutral” view is fully consistent with the “anti-theoretical” view ex-
pressed on pp. 2-3 above. 
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and sympathy from others, or reduced responsibility. However, the by far most impor-
tant benefit is that medicine as an art and science is sometimes good at dealing with the 
problem, e.g. to actually cure the person, or to reduce his suffering. In short, medical-
type interventions might sometimes be the most effective way to deal with the problem. 
   However, there are also a number of possible disadvantages associated with being 
classified as mentally ill. We are already familiar with some of these apparent harms, 
e.g. that attributions of mental disorder can be used to justify involuntary mental hos-
pitalization and compulsory treatment, and that the people who are classified as men-
tally ill are often stigmatized as a result. Some of these apparent harms might be more 
beneficial than they seem, however, e.g. compulsory treatment isn’t always a bad thing. 
As far as the issue of stigmatization is concerned, it is true that the concept of mental 
illness is often a stigmatizing concept (as e.g. Szasz (2000) claims), and that the attribu-
tion of mental illness might have dehumanizing and degrading effects. The idea that “a 
diagnosis of mental illness automatically removes the ‘patient’ from the class of human 
beings called ‘persons’” (p. 13) is probably somewhat exaggerated, however. It should 
also be noted that successful attributions of mental disorder might help certain people 
avoid an even worse kind of stigma, e.g. the horrible treatment they would perhaps get 
if they were viewed as obsessed or bewitched rather than as ill. This is not to deny that 
mental illness is sometimes associated with stigma, however, and that it would be better 
for some people to be viewed as e.g. “deeply troubled” rather than as disordered. 
   Other possible harms associated with being classified as mentally ill are less apparent. 
For example, if medicine does not hold the legitimate expertise to deal with a certain 
problem or condition, medical-type interventions are not just ineffective, but they might 
also be positively damaging. Attributions of mental disorder can also make the individ-
ual more helpless or powerless, e.g. by letting him enter the sick role, and thus remove 
some of his responsibility, or by causing him to rely too much on medical expertise 
rather than on himself. 
   We have also seen that classifying certain “mental afflictions and abnormal behav-
iours” as mental disorders rather than as e.g. “problems in living” has large-scale social 
effects. For example, how large a part of the population that is categorized as mentally 
disturbed has an effect on how much resources we spend on psychiatric care, compen-
sation, research, and the like. Moreover, what conditions that are classified as disorders 
has an effect on how powerful the medical professions are, and to what extent people 
rely on medical expertise rather than e.g. on themselves. It also serves the interest of the 
pharmaceutical industry, and it if Szasz (2000) and others are right, it may also serve the 
interest of the conservative forces in the society at large, viz. by making various social-
control measures possible. However, it seems somewhat exaggerated to argue that the 
primary function of “the mental hospital has always been, and continues to be, the psy-
chiatric segregation and control of socially undesirable persons, typically because they 
are deemed to pose a ‘danger’ to the ‘health of society.’” (Szasz 2000, p. 11) 
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   Do any of these large-scale effects give us a reason for rejecting the concept of mental 
disorder altogether? Well, this seems to depend on what the alternative would be. One 
possible scenario is that far more resources would be spent on various kinds of social 
work or psychotherapy, and that this would increase the power and status of the social 
worker, benefit the psychotherapeutic industry, and so on. It is also possible that the 
people who currently frequent our mental hospitals would be controlled or excluded in 
other ways, ways which would not necessarily be more humane. 
   To conclude, it seems to me that as far as the practical considerations are concerned, 
we should keep our concept of mental disorder. However, it remains to be seen to what 
extent the conditions currently classified as mental disorders ought to be classified in 
this way. In any case, I will assume that we should have a concept of mental disorder, 
and that it is of at least some importance how this concept is defined. But before we turn 
to the question of how it should be defined, it might be appropriate to reflect on what 
we want a such definition to be like, i.e. what constitutes a “good” definition of “mental 
disorder”. 
 
Some tentative desiderata for a “good” definition 
So, what kind of answer are we looking for, what constitutes a “good” definition of 
“mental disorder”? Or alternatively put, what desiderata (requirements, or conditions of 
adequacy) should a definition satisfy, according to what criteria should we assess how 
“good” or “bad” a certain proposed definition is? Before we take a closer look at the dif-
ferent conditions that a definition of “mental disorder” should ideally satisfy, it is im-
portant to note that these conditions determine what kind of arguments that can be 
given for or against a given analysis of the concept. It should also be noted that some of 
these desiderata are closely related to why we want a definition in the first place, i.e. to 
the purposes of a definition, whereas other conditions are more or less independent of 
these purposes. 
   In the following, I will assume that our present category of mental disorder is “socially 
constructed”, i.e. that it is a human invention that does not correspond to any natural 
kind or category. I will also assume that there is no natural kind that even remotely co-
incides with our present category of disorder, and that there is (for this reason) no such 
thing as the correct or true definition of the concept.19 This suggests that we cannot re-
quire from a definition that it captures some real or natural category, i.e. that we should 
look elsewhere for our conditions of adequacy. Given that we want such a definition 
mainly for certain practical purposes, this is just how it should be. Even if there were a 
real definition of the concept (i.e. some natural category which has some affinity with 
our present category), it can be argued that there is no need to look for it. 
                                                 
19 These constructionist claims will be further elaborated on pp. 42-43 below. 
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   Here are a number of different conditions that a definition of “mental disorder” 
should ideally satisfy. 
 
1. The ordinary language condition (“descriptive adequacy”). There are two aspects of this 
condition. First, a definition of “mental disorder” should be consistent with how the 
phrase is ordinarily used,20 particularly how it is used (not defined!) by the medical pro-
fessions, and second, a definition should (at least to some extent) explain our intuitive 
judgments of disorder and non-disorder (cf. Wakefield 2000a, p. 17). 
   The idea that a definition should be consistent with ordinary usage has many facets. 
First, a definition should include those conditions we intuitively regard as pathological, 
and it should exclude what we intuitively regard as non-pathological, e.g. normal grief, 
unhappy love, and other “problems in living”. In particular, a definition should reflect 
our generally agreed upon, uncontroversial judgements about what conditions are dis-
orders, e.g. that schizophrenia and major depression are disorders. Second, a definition 
should be consistent with our current diagnostic systems (which is not to say that the 
concept of disorder has to be defined in the same type of terms as the different disorders 
in the plural, e.g. symptomatically). Third, a definition should also be consistent with 
the fact that attributions of disorder are attempts to partially explain people’s behaviour 
and/or symptoms (cf. Wakefield 1992, p. 377). 
   Fourth, a definition of “mental disorder” should be consistent with the fact that we 
tend to regard the category of mental disorder as a sub-category of the more general 
category disorder (malady, or pathological condition), a category which also includes 
somatic disorders. This suggests that we want an analysis of “mental disorder” that is a 
special case of a general theory of disorder, i.e. that our definition should be consistent 
with such a theory. If we combine this with the idea that “the concept of  ‘ordinary’ or 
bodily illness is the more basic, the paradigmatic and the far more well-entrenched con-
cept” (Svensson 1990, p. 18), and that the concept of mental disorder is some kind of ex-
tension of this concept, we get the requirement that a certain condition cannot be clas-
sified as a mental disorder unless it is sufficiently or relevantly similar to the different 
somatic disorders.21  
                                                 
20 At this point, it is worth noting that the term “disorder” is probably not very common in everyday
speech (terms like e.g. “malady” or “pathological” might be more common) . This suggests that what
we should really require of a definition is (rather) that it is consistent with how terms like “disease”,
“illness” and “injury” (terms which denote the different sub-categories of disorder) are ordinarily used.
21 This is what Svensson (1990) calls “the comparison postulate” (cf. pp. 14-15 above). This postulate
says that “the feasibility (or non-feasibility) of conceptualizing certain forms of human behaviour and 
mental afflictions in terms of mental illness must be the outcome of a comparison of these ‘mental-ill-
ness’ problems with ‘ordinary’ or bodily illnesses. That is, it is through showing that phenomena called
mental illnesses are sufficiently alike bodily illnesses (or that they are not) that one can sustain (or re-
fute) the reasonableness of the concept of mental illness.” (p. 18) 
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   That is, it is desirable to arrive at a definition which does not classify a condition as a 
mental disorder unless it is sufficiently like a bodily disorder for the two categories to be 
subsumed under a common head-category (cf. ibid., pp. 12-13). It is also desirable, how-
ever, and this is the fifth point, that the two types of conditions are sufficiently dissimilar 
to motivate the separation of them into two distinguishable sub-categories (ibid., p. 13). 
That is, a definition of “mental disorder” should help us draw a line between mental 
and somatic disorders. One may ask whether this is of any practical importance, how-
ever, and if so, why. A possible answer to this question is that such a distinction can 
help us demarcate the area of responsibility for psychiatry. 
   The idea that a definition should (at least to some extent) explain why we think and 
talk about mental disorders the way we do also has several facets. For example, a defi-
nition should (ideally) explain why almost all of us regard conditions like schizophrenia 
as pathological, whereas we tend to disagree about whether e.g. certain “personality 
disorders”, alcoholism, or learning difficulties should be classified as disorders. A defi-
nition should also explain our judgements about severity, e.g. why we conceive of cer-
tain disorders as more severe than others. It would also be an advantage if a definition 
could explain why so many people tend to believe that the category of mental disorder 
is an objective category, e.g. that it was eventually discovered that homosexuality is not 
really a disorder, or that it has not yet been discovered whether “burnout syndrome” is 
really a disorder. 
 
2. The value condition. What we think of as disorders are typically undesirable conditions 
that we think we ought to control and avoid. In particular, we tend to regard a disorder 
as something bad or harmful for the person who suffers from it. A definition of “mental 
disorder” should not just be consistent with these facts. Ideally, it should also explain 
why it is that we regard most or all disorders as e.g. harmful. And if disorders are neces-
sarily undesirable, as e.g. Wakefield seems to think,22 a definition should explain this 
too, for example by containing an explicit value component. It is worth noting that the 
value condition is but a special case of the ordinary language condition, but because of 
its central importance, I’ve decided to make it a category of its own. 
 
3. The theory condition. The idea that a definition should (to some extent) explain why we 
regard certain conditions as disorders, or why we think of certain disorders as worse (or 
more severe) than others, strongly suggests that a definition of “mental disorder” 
should ideally take the form of a general and coherent conceptual theory. A mere list of 
diagnostic categories will not do. For example, the idea that something is a mental dis-
order if and only if it is included in e.g. DSM-IV or ICD-10 is not a good definition. What 
we want is a category of mental disorder that is based on a coherent, explicit set of de-
                                                 
22 “To have a disease, an illness, or a disorder is necessarily to have a (prima facie) negative condition”
(Wakefield 2000a, p. 19, my italics). 
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fining features, i.e. a category which (in psychometric terms) exhibits a high degree of 
construct validity (cf. Jablensky and Kendell 2002, p. 10). Such a category doesn’t just 
have explanatory value, it can also (if commonly accepted) facilitate communication be-
tween different groups or individuals. 
 
4. The precision condition. A definition of “mental disorder” should be sufficiently clear 
and precise so that there is, in principle, no doubt whether or not a certain condition be-
longs to the category of mental disorder. That is, a definition should draw a sharp con-
ceptual boundary between mental disorders and related non-pathological conditions, 
and between mental and somatic disorders. Svensson (1990) calls this condition the 
“conceptual stringency postulate”. According to this postulate, “it is desirable, worth-
while and to some extent urgent to strive for conceptual stringency and clarity” (p. 18), 
and accepting the postulate “simply requires that one should regard a higher degree of 
conceptual stringency as preferable to a lower degree, and therefore worth striving for” 
(ibid., p. 19). 
   It is worth noting that precise definitions and sharp conceptual boundaries sometimes 
give rise to the idea that there are equally sharp boundaries in nature. We should reject 
this idea, however. In reality, the boundary between disorders and other conditions are 
often fuzzy, perhaps especially in the case of personality disorders. This suggests that a 
“dimensional approach” is sometimes better than a “categorical model”, i.e. that it is (at 
least sometimes) preferable to think of the difference between “normality” and pathol-
ogy as a matter of degree rather than as a “categorical” (or qualitative) difference.23  
   So, are there any good reasons to adopt a more dimensional approach in this context? 
Jablensky and Kendell (2002) seem to think so. On their view, “[t]he cardinal disadvan-
tage of the categorical model is its propensity to encourage a ‘discrete entity’ view of the 
nature of psychiatric disorders. […] Dimensional models, on the other hand, have the 
major conceptual advantage of introducing explicitly quantitative variation and graded 
transition between […] ‘normality’ and pathology. […] This is important not only in ar-
eas of classification where the units of observation are traits. […] There are clear advan-
tages, too, for the diagnosis of ‘sub-threshold’ conditions such as minor degrees of mood 
disorder and the specific ‘complaints’ which constitute the bulk of the mental ill-health 
seen in primary care settings.” (p. 15)24 Other examples of conditions that seem to exist 
along a continuum are voyeurism and other “paraphilias” (cf. Culver and Gert 1982, p. 
106). 
                                                 
23 My own conceptual theory of health is another example of a dimensional approach. Cf. e.g. Brülde
2000a, 2000b, Brülde and Tengland 2003.
24 These “sub-threshold” conditions do not just include the cases which barely meet the diagnostic cri-
teria, and that are associated with only mild distress or impairment in functioning. It has also been
shown that there are cases (e.g. of depression) that “fail to fulfil the criteria for a disorder in the present
diagnostic classifications” but that are nevertheless associated with “significant distress and disability
and with clinically significant signs or symptoms” (cf. Üstün et al 2002, pp. 30-31).
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   The dimensional approach might seem particularly attractive in the case of personality 
disorder. In the ICD-10, personality disorders are described as ”deeply ingrained and 
enduring behaviour patterns, manifesting themselves as inflexible responses to a broad 
range of personal and social situations”, and they represent ”either extreme or signifi-
cant deviations from the way the average individual in a given culture perceives, thinks, 
feels, and particularly relates to others.” (The quotation is from Kendell 2002, pp. 110-
111.) This suggests that personality disorders are simply abnormal varieties of sane psy-
chic life, i.e. that “[t]he behaviours and attitudes that define personality disorders are 
probably graded traits present to a lesser degree in many other people” (ibid., p. 112), 
which, in turn, makes it tempting to adopt a dimensional approach. According to Pil-
grim (2002), we should even abandon the concept (i.e. category) of personality disorder 
altogether.25
   In short, if this there is any truth in the dimensional approach, this suggests that it is 
not always desirable to draw a sharp conceptual boundary between e.g. mental disor-
ders and related non-pathological conditions. This is of course incompatible with the 
precision condition as formulated above, since this formulation presupposes the cate-
gorical model. The condition can be formulated in a way that is compatible with the di-
mensional view, however. On this view, there is a conceptual co-variation between the 
degree to which someone is disordered and his position in one or several other dimen-
sions. To accept the precision condition for a dimensional definition is simply to require 
that it is made quite clear what these other dimensions are (cf. Brülde 2000a, 2000b). 
 
5. The reliability condition. A definition should be practically applicable, it should be rela-
tively easy in practice (and not just in principle) to determine whether a certain condition 
belongs to the category of mental disorder (as defined). If this is the case, it is likely that 
different observers can apply the concept in the same way, i.e. agree on what conditions 
that should be included in the category and what conditions that should be excluded. It 
is more likely that a definition will satisfy the reliability condition if the criteria for ap-
plying the concept are operational, i.e. if the concept is defined in descriptive terms, and 
if these terms are, moreover, observational.26 The presence of a mental disorder can then 
be established on observational grounds. 
   Practical applicability is obviously important for communication purposes, i.e. it is 
likely that a definition that satisfies this condition can (if commonly accepted) improve 
or facilitate communication between different groups and individuals, both across dif-
ferent settings and cultures. 
 
                                                 
25 Categorical and dimensional models need not be mutually exclusive, however, e.g. it is also possible
to “combine qualitative categories with quantitative trait measurements” (Jablensky and Kendell 2002, 
p. 16). 
26 Or expressed in psychometric terms: A high degree of reliability seems to presuppose content valid-
ity, i.e. that the category has empirical referents (cf. Jablensky and Kendell 2002, p. 10).
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6. The simplicity conditions. (a) The class of conditions categorized as mental disorders 
should be as homogenous as possible. This suggests that we should (other things being 
equal) prefer a theory which defines “mental disorder” in terms of one criterion only, or 
in terms of conjunction of different criteria, to a theory which defines “mental disorder” 
in terms of e.g. a disjunction of different criteria. For example, the idea that all harmful 
dysfunctions are disorders is more attractive than the idea that all dysfunctions that are 
either harmful to self or to others are disorders. (This can be regarded as a desire for 
monism or parsimony.) (b) A definition which does not contain a number of ad hoc ex-
ceptions or modifications is (other things being equal) preferable to a theory which con-
tains such modifications. For example, the idea that all disabilities caused by mental fac-
tors are mental disorders is, according to this condition, more attractive than the idea 
that only health-related disabilities caused by certain kinds of mental factors are mental 
disorders. (This can perhaps be regarded as a “desire for unity”.) 
 
These six desiderata are all conditions of adequacy in the strict sense, i.e. conditions that 
are (in part) derived from certain purposes, but which do not by themselves constitute 
such purposes. We will now turn to some conditions which explicitly appeal to the prac-
tical purposes of a definition listed above, e.g. the idea that a definition should help us 
decide who is entitled to health care or compensation. It should be noted that these con-
ditions imply that a definition can be criticized for not fulfilling these purposes. 
 
7. The condition of normative adequacy. This is the idea that a definition of “mental disor-
der” should (ideally) help us make better decisions in a number of areas. For example, 
such a definition should help us determine what services and compensation arrange-
ments there should be for people who suffer from a certain condition; it should help us 
determine what criminals that should be legally excused or sentenced to psychiatric 
care; it should help us decide coercive psychiatric treatment is appropriate; it should 
help us specify the goals of medicine, and to distinguish the special responsibilities of 
mental health professionals from those of other professionals; and it might perhaps also 
help us to relate to people with problems in a more appropriate way (on the interper-
sonal level). However, it is (as we have seen on p. 13 above) doubtful whether there is 
one single definition that fits all these practical purposes. 
 
8. Other moral considerations. It is possible that we should somehow take it into consid-
eration that it might have harmful consequences for people to be classified as mentally 
ill, e.g. that they are sometimes stigmatized as a result. For example, it might be argued 
that the concept should be defined in a way that makes abuse difficult, or that a defini-
tion should (ideally) not ”open the way to regarding a wide range of purely social dis-
abilities (such as aggressive, uncooperative behaviour or an inability to resist lighting 
fires or stealing) as mental disorders” (Kendell 2002, p. 112). This seems to suggest that 
we should exclude as many conditions as possible from the concept of mental disorder 
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(cf. p. 14 above). The question is whether there is any other way in which a definition 
can satisfy this condition. As far as I can see, there is only one other possibility, viz. the 
following one: It seems that this condition might put certain restraints on the evaluative 
content of the concept, e.g. that it tells us to prefer a less evaluative definition to a more 
evaluative definition, an explicitly evaluative definition to a definition that is merely 
implicitly evaluative, and a definition that relies on considerations of harm to a defini-
tion that permits to rely on judgements of normality when classifying something as a 
disorder. 
 
This concludes our list of tentative desiderata for a good definition of “mental disorder”. 
Let us now take a quick look at to what extent these different conditions are in harmony 
with each other, i.e. to what extent they pull in the same direction. We also have to ask 
ourselves what we should do if some of the conditions happen to pull in different direc-
tions, e.g. what desiderata that should be given most weight, and what kind of concep-
tual analysis that is most consistent with this choice. 
 
What kind of conceptual analysis does best fit the criteria?  
The theory condition, the precision condition, the simplicity conditions, and (to some 
extent) the reliability condition seem to pull in the same direction. Taken together, these 
conditions suggest that what we really want is a traditional conceptual analysis in terms 
of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient. That is, the best way to satisfy these 
conditions is most probably to engage in traditional conceptual analysis. 
   It is not likely that our everyday notion (or “folk concept”) of mental disorder can be 
analyzed in this way, however. Murphy and Woolfolk (2000b) are not the only theorists 
who reject the assumption that the folk concept of mental disorder is a unitary, coherent 
concept that can be traditionally defined, i.e. “that there is a consistent set of beliefs that 
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for analysis of a folk concept”, and moreo-
ver, “that there currently exists a coherent set of scientific, clinical, or legal beliefs and 
practices that share a clear understanding of what mental disorders are.” (p. 273) 
   This strongly suggests that there is a tension between the ordinary language condition 
and some of the other desiderata,27 and that we have to make some kind of decision 
about how much weight we should give to the different conditions. One option is of 
course to allow for the possibility that a definition deviates (to some extent) from ordi-
nary language, which would (in turn) allow for a traditional conceptual analysis of the 
concept. Another option is to give so much weight to the ordinary language condition 
that it becomes impossible to give a precise and coherent definition of “mental disorder” 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So what if we choose this option, what 
                                                 
27 The conflict between the ordinary language condition and the simplicity conditions described on pp.
65-66 below is a good example of such a tension. 
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kind of conceptual analysis would this result in? Apart from the dimensional approach 
described on p. 20 above (which is not really an option here), what are the alternatives to 
the traditional categorical analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
   To simply point out that “mental disorder” is a “family concept” (in Wittgenstein’s 
sense) that connects a number of conditions by “family resemblances” does not consti-
tute much of an analysis. To point this out is, in my view, merely to observe that “[t]here 
need be no one bunch of things in common – necessary and sufficient conditions – for 
the same general word […] [e.g. “mental disorder”] to apply to a class of individuals” 
(Hacking 1995, p. 23), and that “[l]abels often work well without strict necessary and 
sufficient conditions” (ibid., p. 23). 
   A somewhat more interesting suggestion (based on this observation) is the idea that 
we should define “mental disorder” in the same way as some of the diagnostic catego-
ries in DSM are defined. We list a number of criteria, and then require that some of these 
criteria must be met, but not necessarily all, for something to count as a disorder. This 
does not sound very promising in this context, however. 
   According to Jablensky and Kendell (2002), this is a kind of “polythetic definition” (as 
opposed to the traditional strategy, which is “monothetic”), in the sense that members of 
a class share a large proportion of their properties but do not necessarily agree on the 
presence of any one property (p. 4) Another example of such a polythetic approach is 
the prototype-matching approach (ibid., p. 4). Many theorists seem to think that some 
kind of prototype analysis is the most appropriate if we want to capture our everyday 
concept of mental disorder. For example, ”Lilienfeld and Marino (1995) maintain that 
mental disorder is an ostensive or Roschian concept, implying that the term can only be 
understood by considering the prototypes of mental disorder.” (Kendell 2002, p. 113)  
   Jablensky and Kendell (2002) describes this “prototype-matching procedure” as fol-
lows: “In this approach, a category is represented by its prototype, i.e. a fuzzy set com-
prising the most common features or properties displayed by “typical” members of the 
category. The features describing the prototype need be neither necessary nor sufficient, 
but they must provide a theoretical ideal against which real individuals or objects can be 
evaluated. Statistical procedures can be used to compute for any individual or object 
how closely they match the ideal type.” (p. 4) That is, something is a mental disorder, on 
this view, if it is ”sufficiently similar to the prototypes of mental disorder (schizophrenia 
and major depression, perhaps)” (Kendell 2002, p. 113).28
                                                 
28 This rudimentary type of prototype analysis is probably sufficient for our purposes, i.e. to define
“mental disorder”. However, if the purpose is to explain in more detail how our ordinary concept actu-
ally works, this rudimentary analysis probably needs to be supplemented by some kind of dimensional
(or multidimensional) approach. An example of such an approach is implicit in Hacking’s (1995) no-
tion of a radial concept. In Hacking’s own words: “Theoretical linguists find more structure in classes 
than mere family resemblance. Each class has best examples […] [i.e. prototypes] and then other exam-
ples that radiate away from the best examples. […] Ostriches differ from robins [the prototypical bird]
in some ways; pelicans differ from robins in others. We cannot arrange all birds in a single linear order 
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   According to Hacking (1995), 
[t]he idea of a prototype is implicit in psychiatry. […] Prototypes [e.g. the examples 
given in the DSM Casebook], and radial classes, whether for birds or mental disor-
ders, are not mere supplements to definitions. They are essential to comprehension. 
One can make a very strong argument, in the philosophy of language, that what 
people understand by a word is not a definition, but a prototype and the class of ex-
amples structurally arranged around the prototype. (p. 24)29
 
In short, what kind of conceptual analysis that is most appropriate seems to depend on 
what our everyday use of the term “mental disorder” is actually like, and on how cen-
tral or important we take the ordinary language condition to be, i.e. how much weight 
we give this condition compared with e.g. the theory condition, the reliability condition, 
or the simplicity conditions. 
   Now that the stage is set, let us look at how the concept of mental disorder can and 
should be defined. 
                                                                                                                                                              
of birdiness, saying that pelicans are more birdy than ostriches but less birdy than robins. If we must
draw a diagram, it should be a circle or a sphere, with ostriches and pelicans farther away from robins 
than hawks or and sparrows, but not in one straight line. The class of birds may be thought of as radial,
with different birds related by different chains of family resemblances, the chains leading in to a central
prototype. Likewise for mental illness, individual patients cannot be simply arranged as more ‘close to’
or ‘distant from’ standard cases. This is because the ways in which a patient differs from the standard 
may themselves be structured.” (pp. 23-24) It may well be the case that “mental disorder” is a radial 
concept in this sense, e.g. that it makes little sense to say, of any two people, that one is more disor-
dered than the other. These matters of “more” and “less” need not concern us here, however. 
29 Another possible way in which the folk concept of mental disorder might be captured is to “func-
tionally define” the concept by showing how it figures in our folk theory of disorder. Such an analysis
has to satisfy certain key “platitudes” about the concept that we all share, and that constrain any analy-
sis of the concept (cf. e.g. Murphy and Woolfolk 2000b, p. 287). It is doubtful whether such a func-
tional definition is an attractive option in this context, however.
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Chapter Two. Conceptual theories of mental disorder 
The general idea: Disorders as undesirable conditions 
caused by internal factors 
It is often assumed that disorders (maladies like diseases and injuries) are physical or 
mental states or processes (e.g. underlying anatomical or physiological pathologies or 
abnormalities) that typically manifest themselves in different kinds of undesirable (e.g. 
harmful) symptoms. This idea can be spelled out as follows: A condition is a disorder if 
and only if (a) it is undesirable or bad (either in itself or because of its consequences), 
and (b) the condition is caused by some type of internal state or process (e.g. a lesion or 
a part dysfunction), i.e. the cause of the undesirable condition is inside the individual’s 
body or mind. 
   If we apply this general idea to the mental case, we get the idea that mental disorders 
are undesirable (e.g. harmful) conditions caused by some kind of internal (presumably 
mental) state or process (e.g. a mental dysfunction). That a person has mental order 
means (roughly) that there is “something wrong” with his or her mind, and that this has 
undesirable consequences. This idea can be formulated as follows: A condition is a men-
tal disorder if and only if (a) the condition is undesirable or bad (let us call this the value 
component of the concept), and (b) the condition is caused by some kind of “underlying” 
mental state or process (let us call this the factual or explanatory component). 
   This rudimentary conceptual theory of mental disorder offers us truth conditions for 
mental disorder statements, i.e. it tells us under what conditions a mental disorder is 
present. It also makes a claim about what kind of thing a mental disorder is, however, 
viz. a “condition” that is caused by e.g. an underlying dysfunction. This seems to suggest 
that mental disorders should be located on the level of the organism as a whole, e.g. that 
they are syndromes, i.e. “dynamic patterns of intercorrelated symptoms and signs that 
have a characteristic evolution over time.” (Jablensky and Kendell 2002, p. 7) This is 
clearly the view of DSM-IV, where it is claimed that “each of the mental disorders is 
conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pat-
tern that occurs in an individual” (DSM-IV-TR, p. xxxi). It is also claimed that 
“[w]hatever its original cause, it [this syndrome or pattern] must currently be consid-
ered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the 
individual.” (ibid., p. xxxi) 
   However, it might also be argued that it is the internal cause, rather than its sympto-
matic manifestations, that is the disorder. Suppose that some kind of harmful dysfunc-
tion analysis is correct, e.g. that a person has a mental disorder if and only if some men-
tal mechanism fails to perform its function, and this causes him harm on the holistic 
level. In this case, it might be argued that the disorder should be identified with the part 
dysfunction itself rather than with the manifestation of this dysfunction, e.g. some clus-
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ter of symptoms and signs. A third ontological possibility is to identify the disorder with 
the whole complex, i.e. to view both the underlying pathology and the symptoms as 
parts of the disorder. I don’t think it is very important which alternative that is chosen, 
but personally, I tend to adopt the second view in the somatic case, e.g. if there is a 
harmful dysfunction, then the disorder is identical with the dysfunction (since this al-
lows for the possibility that there are diseases without symptoms). However, in the 
mental case, it is more tempting to say that the disorder is identical with the syndrome 
that is caused by the dysfunction (since this implies that we can know that a disorder is 
present without having identified any underlying pathology). 
   So, the general view is that a person has a mental disorder if and only if there is an 
“underlying” (preferably mental) state or process that tends to give rise to undesirable 
symptoms. This mixed or hybrid view has been challenged in three different ways. First, 
there is the view that the concept of mental disorder is a purely evaluative concept, i.e. 
that there is really no need for a factual component. Second, it has been argued that the 
concept is a purely factual or scientific concept, that the presence of the right kind of 
internal cause is not just necessary for mental disorder, but also sufficient. And third, it 
has been suggested that more criteria are needed, i.e. that the value component and the 
factual component should be supplemented by a third component, or that at least one of 
these components need to replaced by another type of criterion. Let us look at these 
three objections, to see if there are any good reasons to reject the mixed view. 
 
The pure value approach 
On the radically evaluative view of disorder, the concept of mental disorder is a purely 
evaluative (or perhaps normative) concept. Wakefield (1992) writes: “The pure value 
account of disorder asserts that disorder is nothing (or almost nothing) but a value con-
cept, so that social judgments of disorder are nothing but judgments of desirability ac-
cording to social norms and ideals.” (p. 376) This seems to be Szasz’s view of how the 
concept of mental disorder is actually used in medical contexts (but not of how it should 
be used; as we have seen above, he thinks the concept should be abolished altogether). 
On this view, the term “mental disease” is typically used to refer to undesirable behav-
ioural abnormalities (e.g. misconducts) or undesirable deviations from culturally identi-
fiable social norms (unwanted by the self or others). In short, “what counts as psychopa-
thology is based on a judgment of how the person ought to function”(Szasz 2000, p. 9). A 
possible example of a theorist who has actually adopted this view is Ausubel, who de-
fined “disease” as “any marked deviation, physical, mental or behavioral, from nor-
mally desirable standards of structural or functional integrity” (quoted in Wakefield 
1992, p. 376). 
   The most obvious objection to this view is that there are many undesirable mental af-
flictions and/or behavioural deviations that are not considered disorders, e.g. a disorder 
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is not just any undesirable behaviour.30 It is therefore necessary to draw a line between 
the afflictions and behaviours that are disorders from the ones that are not, and it is hard 
to see how this can be done unless we add some factual requirement, e.g. that the cause 
of the undesirable condition is internal. This suggests that some mixed or hybrid theory 
is most reasonable, partly because such a theory can account for something that the pure 
value account fails to account for, viz. the fact that attributions of disorder are attempts 
to partially explain behaviour and/or symptoms (cf. ibid., p. 377). 
 
The pure scientific approach 
On the so-called traditional medical model (or “machine-fault model”) of disorder,31 
disorders are “machine-faults”, e.g. underlying structural or functional abnormalities. 
These underlying pathologies are typically accompanied by undesirable signs and 
symptoms, but on the pure medical model, these undesirable consequences are not de-
fining characteristics of disorder. That is, the presence of a machine-fault is not just nec-
essary for disorder, but also sufficient. If we add the assumption that the presence of a 
machine-fault can be established in an objective and scientific way, we get the idea that 
it is possible to state in scientific, objective and value-neutral terms that a certain phe-
nomenon is a disorder-type phenomenon, or that a certain person has a disorder. That 
is, the idea is that the concept of disorder is a value-neutral concept that doesn’t contain 
any value component (Boorse, who conceives of disease in this way, has a different idea 
about the concept of illness, however). 
   It is hard to offer any conclusive arguments against the scientific view at as this point, 
e.g. before we know more about how central notions like “part dysfunction” have been 
analyzed. The definitions that have been given have not been very successful, however. 
Consider the idea that disorders are part dysfunctions, and that a part dysfunction is a 
statistical functional abnormality that has a detrimental effect on survival or reproduc-
tion. This view seems to imply that people who are abnormally intelligent in the statisti-
cal sense have a disorder if they live somewhat shorter lives and have less children than 
the average person, even if they are e.g. much happier than this person. This is just one 
of many reasons why we should reject the scientific view. Another reason is that the 
view assumes that the category of mental disorder corresponds to a natural kind (see p. 
17 above and pp. 42-43 below), a third reason is that it gives us a category of disorder 
                                                 
30 That is, the pure value approach fails to satisfy the ordinary language condition. This approach is
highly problematic in other respects as well, e.g. a purely evaluative definition is neither precise nor re-
liable. It might even be suspected that the pure value approach does not satisfy the value condition very
well. The reason for this is that it tends to focus on the wrong kind of value, viz. evaluative normality
rather than harm.
31 Originally, this was a model of disease rather than of disorder. It is not very problematic to conceive
of it as a model of disorder, however. 
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which is not practically useful, and a fourth reason is that it fails to explain that disor-
ders are almost always undesirable conditions.32 Many (but perhaps not all) of these 
objections can be met if we realize that the concept of disorder that best satisfies the de-
siderata for a good definition is, in part, an evaluative concept.  
 
Definitions related to medical practice 
Are there any other possible criteria for mental disorder apart from the evaluative and 
factual (explanatory) criteria mentioned above? The most common type of suggestion is 
probably normative criteria connected to medical practice, e.g. the idea that a disorder 
is, by definition, a condition that health professionals treat, or a condition that (we 
think) should be treated by health professionals or by medical means.33 Reznek is an 
example of someone who claims that suitability for medical treatment is a necessary 
condition for mental disorder. On his view, something can only be a pathological condi-
tion if both (i) it requires medical intervention, and (ii) medical intervention is appropri-
ate.34
   This is not a good suggestion. First, there are disorders for which there is no existing 
treatment. If this objection is met by including possible (undiscovered) medical treat-
ment in the criterion, it can be quite hard to interpret the term “possible” in a way that 
makes the criterion plausible. Second, disorders are not the only problems that we think 
should be handled by health professionals. There are also a number of other problems 
that are assigned to the medical professions because of their special skills, e.g. being 
short, child birth, marital conflicts and occupational problems. In short, there is no nec-
essary connection between a condition’s being a disorder and its requiring medical in-
tervention (cf. Wilkinson 2000, p. 300). Third, if e.g. being entitled to treatment is a de-
fining characteristic of disorder, then it is analytically true to say that someone is enti-
tled to treatment because he is ill. And fourth, “this approach would paradoxically imply 
that lack of social concern can eliminate disorder.” (Wakefield 1992, p. 377) All these 
problems could have been avoided if Reznek and others were clearer about the distinc-
tion between the content of a definition and the practical purpose of making it (e.g. to 
help us decide who is entitled to treatment).  
                                                 
32 That is, scientific definitions fail to satisfy the ordinary language condition, the value condition, and
the condition of normative adequacy. These definitions also have their strengths, however, e.g. they
tend to be sufficiently precise, reliable, and simple.
33 According to Kendell (2002), it has been suggested in the past (e.g. by Kräupl Taylor) that diseases
are simply what doctors treat, but there are, as far as he can tell, ”no contemporary advocates for such a
simplistic view” (pp. 111-112).
34 Cf. also Boorse’s idea that illnesses are diseases which entitle to treatment and excuse normally
criticazable behaviour. But does he really mean that this is so by definition? 
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   To conclude, it seems reasonable to accept the general idea that mental disorders are 
undesirable conditions caused by internal (presumably mental) states and processes, i.e. 
that a plausible analysis of the concept should include both an evaluative component 
and a factual component. This assumption gives rise to two questions: (1) How should 
the evaluative content of the concept of mental disorder (its value component) be char-
acterized? If mental disorders are by definition bad, then in what way are they bad, ac-
cording to whom, and so on? (2) What kind of internal cause is essentially involved in 
mental disorder? How should the factual (or explanatory) component of the concept be 
characterized? 
   The next part will be devoted to the first question, whereas the last part of this essay 
will be devoted to the second question. (This question will also be discussed in more 
depth in Radovic (forthcoming).) 
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Chapter Three. The value component. Harm and other 
bad things 
 
The idea that the concept of mental disorder is “evaluative” or “value laden” is basically 
a rejection of the idea that we can identify a mental disorder, or specify what a mental 
disorder is, in an objective way, i.e. without engaging in some form of value judgement. 
That is, the fundamental idea is that we somehow have to rely on value judgements to 
identify the class of mental disorder, that ascriptions of mental disorder “ineliminably 
involve values”. But how should this idea be further specified, e.g. how should the 
“evaluative content” of the concept of mental disorder be characterized? There are at 
least three questions that are of relevance in this context, namely: 
 
(i) What kind of values or evaluations do we have to rely on to identify the class of men-
tal disorder? For example, if mental disorders are by definition bad, then in what way 
are they bad? 
 
(ii) If attributions of mental disorder essentially involve values, is there any implicit ref-
erence to some specific evaluative standard? If so, whose standard? For example, if men-
tal disorders are by definition bad, then according to whom are they bad? 
 
(iii) If we assume that we somehow have to rely on value judgements to specify the class 
of mental disorder, how exactly do these indispensable value judgements enter the pic-
ture? In what way is the concept of mental disorder (and the judgements that contain 
this concept) value laden? Or more specifically, is the concept value laden “in the onto-
logical or definitional sense” or “in the epistemic sense” (cf. Wakefield 2000b, p. 254)? 
 
That the concept of mental disorder is value laden in the ontological or definitional 
sense means that it is an evaluative concept, i.e. that it has evaluative content in a literal 
sense, that the “correct definition” of the concept contains an explicit value-component. 
If the concept of mental disorder is evaluative in this sense, then judgements about men-
tal disorder are a kind of value judgements, and the truth or falsity of these judgments 
are “dependent of the values that influenced them” (cf. ibid., p. 265). That the concept of 
mental disorder is value laden in the epistemic sense simply means that the recognition 
of mental disorders relies on value judgments, i.e. that we cannot pick out the class of 
mental disorders without recourse to values. 
   Once this distinction is made, it is rather obvious that a concept can be value laden in 
the epistemic sense without being value laden in the definitional sense. Suppose that we 
define “mental disorder” in terms of distress and disability, and that our reason for do-
ing so is that we regard distress and disability as bad for the individual. In this case, the 
concept of mental disorder is not value laden in the definitional sense, i.e. it has no 
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evaluative content.35 This would suggest that our disorder judgements are in principle 
factual, and that the truth or falsity of these judgements are “independent of the values 
that influenced them”, i.e. the idea that distress and disability are bad for us. So the third 
question is really whether the concept of mental disorder is value laden in the ontologi-
cal or definitional sense, or whether it is “merely” value laden in the epistemic sense. 
   In the following, the main focus will be on (i), i.e. the question of what kind of value 
judgements we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder. There are at least 
three kinds of evaluations (i.e. three kinds of “badness”) that might be of relevance 
when we want to determine whether a certain condition should be regarded as a mental 
disorder: (1) Judgements about what is bad or harmful for the individual who has the 
condition. (2) Judgements about what is bad or harmful for others. (3) Judgements about 
abnormal functioning, e.g. the idea that the person’s behaviour deviates from some 
standard of good or normal functioning (where this standard is not fully derived from 
or based on considerations of harm). This is probably the category to which attributions 




It can hardly be denied that mental disorders typically involve some kind of harm to the 
individual who has the disorder, e.g. distress or disability. As Wilkinson (2000) puts it, 
“we have a prima facie reason for believing that a condition is a disorder if it is a state of 
persons which causes them to be harmed (e.g., through death or pain)” (p. 289). This 
strongly suggests that the connection between disorder and harm is conceptual rather 
than contingent, i.e. that we rely rather heavily on considerations of harm when we 
want to determine whether a certain condition should be regarded as a mental disorder. 
   Many theorists go further than this, and claim that harm to the individual is a neces-
sary condition for disorder, and that we don’t have to rely on any other kinds of value 
judgements to delineate the class of mental disorder. For example, Wakefield (1992) 
claims that a condition cannot be a mental disorder unless this condition “causes some 
harm or deprivation of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of the person’s 
culture” (p. 385). 
   The harms that are mentioned in this context (i.e. that are typically associated with 
disorder) are of three different kinds, viz. (a) displeasure (distress, pain, suffering, loss 
                                                 
35 The same thing holds if we define the concept in terms of a certain evaluator or certain standards of 
evaluation, e.g. in terms of what is considered bad by the person who has the condition. In this case, the 
concept of mental disorder is clearly not value laden in the definitional sense, and it is probably not
value laden in the epistemic sense either. This makes me suspect that these accounts are not really (at 
least not in all cases) definitions at all, but rather attempts to explain our disorder judgements in terms 
of actual evaluations. Cf. the section on constructionism on pp. 42-43 below. 
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of pleasure); (b) disability (incapacitation, impairment, loss of freedom, decreased ability 
to act, limitations of social abilities); and (c) significantly increased risk of suffering the 
harms mentioned in (a) or (b), or of suffering death.36 All these three kinds of harm are 
mentioned in DSM-IV’s definition of “mental disorder”, where it is claimed that a dis-
order is a 
clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern […] that is 
associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impair-
ment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased 
risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. (DSM-IV-
TR, p. xxxi, my italics) 
 
It is worth noting that this definition differs from Wakefield’s definition in that there is 
no explicit reference to the concept of harm. There are many other definitions that are 
just like DSM’s definition in this regard. In these cases, the concept of disorder is not 
analyzed in terms of harm, i.e. in evaluative terms, but in terms of distress, disability, or 
the like, i.e. in descriptive terms. For example, Nordenfelt (1995) defines the concept of 
malady (an umbrella term for diseases, impairments, injuries and defects) as follows: 
“M is a type of malady in environment E if, and only if, M is an episode-type which, 
when instanced in a person A in E, causes with high probability illness in A” (p. 149), 
where a person is ill if and only if he is, in standard circumstances, disabled from realiz-
ing his vital goals. Whitbeck and Fulford also conceive of disorders as inner states or 
processes which tend to have a detrimental effect on our ability to act, whereas e.g. 
Spitzer and Reznek also includes a reference to suffering in their definitions.37
   The claim that “mental disorder” should be analyzed in terms of e.g. distress and dis-
ability is really a rejection of the view that the concept is value laden in the definitional 
sense. That is, if the concept is value laden at all, it is value laden “merely” in the epis-
                                                 
36 It is worth noting that a condition (e.g. a symptom) can be harmful or bad for an individual in two 
different ways, viz. finally (bad as an end) or instrumentally (bad as a means). If a condition is harmful
as an end (as in the case of suffering or distress), it has a “direct” (a priori, or non-causal) detrimental
effect on the person’s well-being, and if a condition is harmful as a means (as in the case of disability or 
incapacitation), the negative effect on the person’s well-being is causal rather than “direct”. This sug-
gests that the harms in category (a) are “final harms”, whereas the harms in categories (b) and (c) are
(rather) “instrumental harms”. We should also notice that if disorders are conceived of as syndromes
(clusters of symptoms), then it is not really appropriate to regard them (as Wakefield does) as condi-
tions that cause harm. Even the underlying pathology constitute rather than cause harm, since it is a
form of instrumental harm.
37 Notice that Nordenfelt’s definition includes a reference to the circumstances under which a condition
should be harmful to count as a disorder. This is something that every complete analysis of the concept 
must do, i.e. one must provide an answer to the question “harmful under what circumstances, in what 
environment?” For example, is “standard circumstances” the best reply (as Nordenfelt suggests)? 
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temic sense.38 Does it matter whether mental disorders are regarded as, by definition, 
harmful (as in Wakefield’s case) or whether they are, instead, regarded as, by definition, 
associated with e.g. distress and disability? Well, it seems that there are at least two 
good reasons for choosing the explicitly evaluative alternative, i.e. for not translating 
harm into distress and disability. First, it is important not to forget that the underlying 
reason why distress and disability are relevant to disorder is that they are bad. That is, if 
we believe that the concept is value laden in the epistemic sense, we might as well make 
it evaluative in the definitional sense, so that we don’t loose track of the insight that 
judgements of harm are fundamental to our judgments about disorder.39 And second, 
the list of possible harms due to the right kind of internal cause is (as Wakefield 1992 
points out) potentially endless, which suggests that it makes good sense not to restrict 
ourselves to two or three central kinds of harm  (cf. p. 381). However, it can also be ar-
gued that we should reject the explicitly evaluative alternative, e.g. because a descrip-
tive definition (in terms distress and disability) is both more precise and more reliable. 
   Does this mean that we should endorse the view that mental disorders are harmful 
conditions caused by internal (presumably mental) states and processes, i.e. that harm is 
necessary for disorder? Before we turn to this question, let us first take a brief look at 
question (ii) on p. 31 above. Suppose that mental disorders are, by definition, harmful. Is 
this analysis complete, or do we also have to add something about from whose perspec-
tive it is harmful, or according to what evaluative standard?  
 
Digression: Bad according to whom? 
It is sometimes claimed that diseases or illnesses are, by definition, something that the 
afflicted individual himself regards as bad and undesirable (cf. Boorse’s definition of 
“illness”). This suggests that the crucial thing is not so much whether the condition is 
bad for the individual as whether it is bad according to this individual, i.e. that he or she 
evaluates it as bad. Is this a plausible view? I think not. We first have to ask in what way 
the condition is bad according to the individual. Here, it is rather natural to assume that 
the relevant kind of badness is harm, i.e. badness-for-the-individual. So, it is reasonable 
                                                 
38 On the assumption that terms like “distress” and “disability” are descriptive, that is. It is not quite
certain that the concept of disability is entirely descriptive, however. Consider Culver and Gert’s (1982) 
analysis of the notion of disability: To be disabled is (1) “to lack some ability that is characteristic
[normal] of the species at the appropriate level of maturation, such as the ability to walk, talk, or see” 
(ibid., p. 76), or to have “an extraordinary low degree of that ability” (ibid., p. 77), and (2) this lack of 
ability is not “due to the lack of some specialized training not naturally provided to all or almost all 
members of the species” (ibid., pp. 75–76). It is also added that”[a]n overwhelming majority of non-
diseased, noninjured members of the species must have had the ability for it to be characteristic of the 
species” (ibid., p. 77). This suggests that attributions of disability are, at least to some extent, based on
evaluative judgements of what is normal and abnormal.
39 Or in slightly different terms, an explicitly evaluative definition satisfies the value condition to a
higher degree than a definition which is merely “implicitly” evaluative, viz. perfectly!
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to assume that an internally caused condition can only be a disorder if the individual 
herself thinks it is bad for her? Suppose that an individual believes that a certain condi-
tion is good for her, e.g. when suffering from a manic episode, but that she is mistaken, 
i.e. that the condition is really harmful for her. In this case, it seems appropriate to say 
that she is suffering from a disorder. That is, the crucial thing is whether the condition is 
bad for the individual, not whether it is (in some way or other) bad from her perspective. 
   So, is there any reason to refer to any other standard in order to determine whether a 
certain condition is a disorder, e.g. “the standards of the person’s culture” (as Wakefield 
seems to suggest)? I think not, viz. for the following reasons: Suppose we want to de-
termine whether a certain newly discovered condition is a mental disorder. In this case, 
we might want to know whether it is really harmful (period), not whether it is harmful 
according to the standards of the person’s culture, e.g. our own culture. This is only 
relevant when we want to explain why certain conditions are actually classified as disor-
ders in a certain culture,40 not when we want to know what conditions that should be 
classified as disorders. This is partly due to the fact that local cultural standards might 
be just as mistaken as the standards of the individual involved, and if we would come to 
realize that our own cultural standard is mistaken, it is highly unlikely that we would 
accept Wakefield’s (1992) idea that disorders are conditions that cause “harm or depri-
vation of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of the person’s culture” (p. 
384). It is also worth noting that Wakefield’s criterion is (in this formulation) a descrip-
tive rather an evaluative criterion: To say that a certain condition is deemed negative by 
a certain “sociocultural standard” is a factual statement, and to analyze the concept of 
mental disorder in such terms doesn’t just make the concept value-neutral in the defini-
tional sense, but probably also in the epistemic sense. Hence, we should drop all refer-
ences to perspectives and specific standards of evaluation. The crucial thing is whether a 
condition is bad (e.g. harmful), and not whether it is bad from a certain perspective or 
according to a certain standard. 
 
Is harm really necessary for disorder? 
Let us now try to find out whether the presence of harm is necessary for disorder. Or 
more specifically, whether there are any types of mental disorder that are either not as-
sociated with harm for the individual, or not considered disorders primarily in virtue of 
being associated with harm. That is, as long as we have manifest harms in mind, the 
question is not really whether one can find instances of disorder that are not associated 
with harm. (If we think of significant risk for harm as a kind of harm, however, it seems 
to matter less whether we have types or instances in mind.)41
                                                 
40 Cf. the section on constructionism on pp. 42-43 below.
41 A question that can’t really be discussed at this point is whether harm with the right kind of cause is 
sufficient for disorder. There are obviously many harmful conditions that are not disorders, e.g. “normal 
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   An example of a condition that might not be considered a disorder by virtue of being 
harmful for the individual is pedophilia. In DSM-IV, this condition is characterized as 
follows: 
(A) Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or 
children (generally age 13 years or younger). (B) The fantasies, sexual urges, or be-
haviors cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning. (C) The person is at least 16 years and at least 5 
years older than the child or children in criterion A. (DSM-IV, p. 528) 
 
As it is characterized here, this condition is clearly harmful (due to criterion B). Now, 
assume that A and C are both satisfied, but not B. Is there really no disorder present in 
this case? Moreover, even if all three criteria are satisfied, it might be suspected that A 
and C are the decisive criteria, i.e. that it is not really B that makes the condition a disor-
der. In fact, it is hard to avoid the impression that criterion B has been added to fit DSM-
IV’s general definition of “mental disorder” (cf. p. 33 above).42
   Now, consider the central diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder: 
There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others oc-
curring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: (1) fail-
ure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as indicated by re-
peatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest; (2) deceitfulness, as indicated 
by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure; 
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indi-
cated by repeated physical fights or assaults; (5) reckless disregard for safety of self 
or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain 
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations; (7) lack of remorse, as indi-
cated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from 
another (DSM-IV, pp. 649-650, DSM-IV-TR, p. 706). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
grief” or unrequited love (or infatuation), and the idea is that the difference between these conditions
and disorders is that conditions of the latter type have “the right kind of cause”, viz. some kind of inter-
nal immediate or proximate cause. But before we know how this cause should be characterized, we 
can’t really tell whether this criterion draws the line where we intuitively want it to be, e.g. so that panic
attacks count as pathological whereas normal grief does not. 
42 In this context, it is worth noting that criterion (B) is given a new formulation in DSM-IV-TR,
namely: “The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked
distress or interpersonal difficulty.” (p. 572) That is, harm (distress or disability) is no longer a neces-
sary condition for pedophilia. The general definition of “mental disorder” remains untouched in DSM-
IV-TR, however. 
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Again, it might be asked if this is this really a disorder in virtue of the fact that it is 
harmful for the individual. It is true that a person who satisfies these criteria is highly 
likely to get into different kinds of trouble, but is this really the reason why we tend to 
think of his condition as a disorder? I think not. It seems more likely that we classify him 
as disordered because he tends to cause a lot of harm to others. 
   To conclude, if conditions like pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder are cor-
rectly classified as mental disorders, then they are not disorders by virtue of being 
harmful for the individual who has the condition, but rather because these conditions 
are abnormal and/or harmful to others.43 This suggests that we should not draw the 
line between the pathological and the non-pathological on basis of harm-for-the-
individual-evaluations alone, but that we sometimes need to make use of different kinds 
of evaluations as well. To see if this is a plausible suggestion, let us take a closer look at 
the two most intuitively plausible candidates, viz. harmful-for-others-judgements and 
judgements of abnormality (including attributions of irrationality). Do we ever have to 
make use of these types of evaluative considerations when we attribute a mental disor-
der to someone, or when we specify the class of mental disorder? 
 
2. Harm for others 
Is it ever plausible to regard a condition as a mental disorder because it has bad conse-
quences for others, e.g. because the afflicted individual is dangerous, violent or threaten-
ing, or because he acts in a way that is weird or disturbing (due to the right kind of in-
ternal causes)? Or more specifically: (a) Do we ever need to resort to value judgements 
of the form “this is harmful to others” in order to come up with a plausible concept of 
mental disorder? Is this type of evaluative consideration ever relevant? And (b) is this 
                                                 
43 Culver and Gert (1982) do not regard this as a good objection to the idea that harm is necessary for
disorder. On their view, a pedophilia-type condition can only be a disorder if it is harmful for the indi-
vidual who has the condition, e.g. if the relevant fantasy or behaviour is “ego-dystonic” (distressful and
unpleasant for the person). So, what about those cases where condition (B) is not satisfied, i.e. where 
the relevant fantasy or behaviour is “ego-syntonic”?  Here, they argue that ego-syntonic fantasies are
never disorders, no matter how bizarre they are (p. 102). They do admit that some ego-syntonic behav-
iours are disorders, however, but not because they are abnormal and/or harmful to others. In their view,
an ego-syntonic sexual behaviour can only qualify as a disorder (i) if it is “not under voluntary control”,
or (ii) “if it has a high likelihood of being generally known to or discovered by others, and the nearly
universal reaction of others would be one of repugnance and revulsion” (p. 103). In my view, this is a 
rather far-fetched defence of the idea that harm is necessary for disorder. If having sex with very young
children is a mental disorder, is it really a disorder by virtue of the fact that it is “universally considered
to be repulsive”, and that the person is likely to suffer harm as a result? Is it not more reasonable to as-
sume that the reason why it is a disorder is identical with the reason why it is “the target of general re-
pugnance” in the first place, viz. because it is abnormal and/or harmful to others?
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type of evaluation ever sufficient as value component, i.e. is harmfulness to others with 
the right kind of internal cause ever sufficient for mental disorder?44
   (a) This question has already been answered in the affirmative, but here is another ar-
gument. According to Szasz and others, the primary criterion for involuntary mental 
hospitalization is dangerousness, to self and/or others (cf. e.g. Szasz 2000, p. 10) Now, if 
psychiatric coercion is not just used to reduce the risk of suicide, but also to reduce the 
risk of e.g. homicide, it would be odd if this is not reflected at all in the concept of disor-
der. That is, if we can detain a mentally ill person because he is dangerous, it seems that 
this dangerousness can not be left out of the concept of mental illness altogether. 
   (b) Suppose that a certain individual is in a condition that makes him dangerous to 
others, and that this condition has the right kind of internal cause. Is this circumstance 
ever a sufficient condition for mental disorder? Well, we can’t really tell until we know 
how this cause should be characterized, but my guess is that circumstances of this kind 
are never really sufficient for disorder. In my tentative view, the dangerousness in ques-
tion must always be accompanied by some other kind of abnormality to be indicative of 
mental illness, e.g. the fact that the person behaves violently for no apparent reason (his 
behaviour is not intelligible) or the fact that his actions are compulsive. 
 
3. Abnormal functioning on the holistic level 
Is it ever plausible to regard a condition as a mental disorder because it is abnormal, e.g. 
highly irrational, or more specifically, because it is associated with abnormal function-
ing or deviant behaviour (assuming that the condition has the right kind of internal 
cause)? Or more specifically: (a) Do we ever need to resort to value judgements of the 
form “this behaviour or response is a marked and undesirable deviation from the nor-
mal” in order to come up with a plausible concept of mental disorder? Are evaluative 
considerations of this type ever relevant? And (b) do attributions of abnormality ever 
constitute the full evaluative content of the concept of disorder, i.e. is abnormality with 
the right kind of internal cause ever sufficient for mental disorder? We might also ask (c) 
whether some kind of abnormality is necessary for disorder. 
   Before we take a closer look at these questions, there are a number of things that need 
to be clarified. For example, what do people like Szasz or Ausubel mean when they say 
that the term “mental disorder” actually refers (or should refer) to mental or behav-
ioural deviations from some norm or standard? For example, what kind of norm or 
judgement does Szasz (2000) have in mind when he claims that “what counts as psy-
chopathology is based on a judgment of how the person ought to function” (p. 9)?45
                                                 
44 It might also be asked whether harmfulness to others is necessary for disorder, but this question is 
obviously too stupid to be taken seriously. 
45 This evaluative view must of course be distinguished from the idea that mental disorders are devia-
tions from the statistically normal (on the holistic or behavioural level). The latter view is quite implau-
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   In Szasz’s case, the relevant norms are, it seems, primarily moral or legal norms. On 
this view, the behavioural “abnormalities” that are regarded as mental disorders are 
often deviations towards the immoral or the illegal (i.e. misconducts). As I see it, other 
kinds of norms might also be relevant, however. For example, the idea that it is patho-
logical to totally ignore one’s own appearance might be based on an aesthetic norm, 
whereas the idea that it is pathological to grieve intensely for years and years after a loss 
has occurred can perhaps be seen as an attribution of irrationality. And as Wakefield 
(2000a) points out, irrationality is sometimes viewed as “the hallmark of mental distur-
bance”, i.e. it is rather commonly believed that “mental disorder often consists of a 
breakdown in the capacity for rational thought or action” (p. 18). 
   It is important to note that for this view to make any sense at all, we have to assume 
that the relevant standards are not ideals (standards of good or perfect functioning), but 
“standards of normality”. We also have to assume that the deviation from the norm is 
both marked and negative, since no one would regard a slight or positive deviation as 
pathological. Moreover, the idea that a condition can qualify as pathological by virtue of 
its abnormality can hardly constitute an alternative to the two harmfulness views unless 
we assume that the relevant standard of normal functioning is not based on considera-
tions of harm alone.46 Let us now return to the three questions: 
   (a) There is no doubt that our actual disorder judgements can often be explained in 
terms of what we find normal and abnormal.47 But is this how it should be, i.e. is it 
sometimes necessary to make use of abnormality judgements to specify the class of men-
tal disorder in a plausible way? I think so. To return to the example in (b) on p. 38 above, 
                                                                                                                                                              
sible, by the way, e.g. because it implies that positive statistical deviations like excellence in strength or 
intelligence are disorders. It is also important to distinguish the view that disorders are deviations on the
holistic level from the view that disorders are (by definition) caused by deviations on the “part level”, 
e.g. anatomical (structural) or physiological (functional) abnormalities. We will return to the latter idea 
on p. 50 and pp. 58-59.
46 For example, it might be argued that irrational beliefs can only be indicative of mental disorder when
they are associated with a lack in the “ability to believe”, i.e. that irrationality is, in this context, best 
regarded as a disability (i.e. as a kind of harm) rather than as a mere abnormality. This view is adopted 
by Culver and Gert (1982), who suggest that “irrational beliefs are symptoms of mental maladies be-
cause they count as the lack of the ability to believe. What is wrong with having psychotic delusions,
such as paranoid delusions, is not that they are false but rather that they show the person does not have 
the ability to believe; he does not respond to the overwhelming evidence in a way that is appropriate for 
someone with his knowledge and intelligence.” (p. 113) 
47 For example, the fact that certain sexual conditions (e.g. “paraphilias” like fetishism, transvestism, or 
voyeurism) are classified as mental disorders is probably best explained in this way. According to
Culver and Gert (1982), this is the primary reason why DSM-III lists some of the paraphilias as mental
disorders (even though this is not explicitly stated). For example, in cases like transvestism, “the defin-
ing criteria for the disorder are whether some deviant fantasies and/or behaviours are present and 
whether heterosexual activity is weak or absent” (p. 106). On Culver and Gert’s view, this suggests that 
DSM has adopted “the psychological theory that heterosexuality (fantasy and behavior) between con-
senting adults is the ideal and that except for ego-syntonic homosexuality the absence of heterosexual-
ity is ipso facto a mental disorder” (ibid., p. 105). 
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a highly dangerous individual can (I think) only be classified as mentally ill if some 
other kind of abnormality is present, e.g. if his behaviour is, to a high degree, irrational 
or unintelligible. 
   (b) Is abnormality (with the right kind of internal cause) ever a sufficient condition for 
disorder? Let us first note that there are many behavioural deviations that are not re-
garded disorders, e.g. certain kinds of criminal or morally repugnant behaviour. It is 
hard to tell whether these behaviours are caused by the right kind of internal factors, 
however. So, let’s reconsider the case of pedophilia, assuming that this condition has the 
right kind of cause, and that it is, in part, constituted by abnormal sexual preferences. Is 
the presence of this abnormality sufficient to make the condition pathological? I think 
not. In my view, the abnormality must be associated with some kind of harm to be in-
dicative of mental disorder. That is, that a condition is abnormal is not sufficient to make 
it pathological, it is also necessary that it is harmful to the individual or to others.48 The 
main reason why we should reject the idea that deviance (with the right kind of cause) 
can be a sufficient condition for mental disorder is practical.49
   (c) Is the presence of an abnormality necessary for mental disorder? DSM-IV's defini-
tion seems to imply that it is, viz. when it states that a condition (in this case a syndrome 
or pattern) should not be classified as a disorder if it is “merely an expectable and cul-
turally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one” 
(DSM-IV-TR, p. xxxi). Assuming that this can be interpreted as a criterion of disorder 
(and not merely as an easily applicable rule of thumb that can help us determine if 
something is a disorder), is it plausible? Let us first note that many physical disorders 
are normal or natural reactions or responses to traumas or life experiences, e.g. influ-
enza, measles, wounds, and burns. This suggests that it is both arbitrary and unjustified 
to exclude all expectable and culturally sanctioned (i.e. normal) responses from the cate-
gory of mental disorder. Posttraumatic stress disorder is a possible counterexample, and 
if Wilkinson (2000) is right, “normal grief” (conceived of as a kind of mental injury) is 
another.50
                                                 
48 That a condition is both abnormal and harmful does not guarantee that it is a disorder, however, e.g.
as in the case of extreme ignorance. But this may well be due to the fact that the condition has the
wrong kind of (internal) cause. 
49 For example, “[t]he tendency to regard deviance as a sufficient feature of sexual disorders leaves
psychiatry open to the justified criticism that deviance per se, sexual or political, has become closely
linked in psychiatric thought with sickness” (Culver and Gert 1982, p. 107). The reason why it is unde-
sirable to pathologize deviances in this way is clearly practical. Cf. also footnote 47 above. 
50 The idea that a disorder is never an “expectable and culturally sanctioned response” can also be re-
garded as an operationalization of the term “dysfunction” (rather than as a normality criterion). This is
how Wakefield (1992) conceives of the idea. On his view, it is a bad operationalization, since it fails to
capture the dysfunction requirement that inspired it (p. 381). This is how the dysfunction requirement is 
formulated in DSM-IV: “Whatever its original cause, it [a disorder] must currently be considered a 
manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither devi-
ant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual
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   In short, it is sometimes necessary to rely on abnormality judgements to specify the 
class of mental disorder in a plausible way. However, abnormality (with the right kind 
of internal cause) is neither necessary nor sufficient for disorder. 
 
Conclusions 
We can now summarize the chapter on mental disorder and value as follows: 
 
(A) Mental disorders are necessarily undesirable conditions, but this does not imply that 
“mental disorder” is an evaluative term. The idea that disorders are bad might also 
function as a condition of adequacy (the value condition), which explains why we use 
(and should use) evaluations to identify the class of mental disorders, i.e. that the con-
cept is value laden in the epistemic sense. However, it seems plausible to conceive of the 
concept as value laden in the definitional sense as well, i.e. to define “mental disorder” 
in explicitly evaluative terms. 
 
(B) The evaluations we have to rely on to distinguish the pathological from the non-
pathological are mainly of the form “this condition is harmful for the person”, but the 
presence of harm is not necessary for disorder. If we want to specify the class of mental 
disorder in a way that is consistent with ordinary language, we need to make use of 
other kinds of evaluations as well, e.g. (i) judgements about what is harmful for others, 
and (ii) judgements about abnormal functioning, e.g. the idea that the person’s behav-
iour deviates substantially from some standard of normal functioning (where this stan-
dard is not fully derived from or based on considerations of harm). 
 
(C) The idea that several kinds of evaluations are relevant in this context is more in line 
with ordinary language than the idea that considerations of harm are the only relevant 
kind of evaluation, and a definition based on this idea might also be normatively ade-
quate to a higher degree. However, the broader view gives us a less coherent concept of 
mental disorder, partly because harmfulness to others or deviating from some standard 
of functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for disorder, and partly because these 
evaluations tend to be used in an ad hoc manner. This suggests that if we accept the 
broader view, we have to give up the idea that “mental disorder” can be defined in 
terms of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient, e.g. that we have to engage in 
some sort of family resemblance analysis instead. 
   The more narrow idea that harm is necessary for mental disorder, and that we do not 
have to rely on any other evaluations to distinguish the pathological from the non-
pathological, has other advantages, e.g. it gives us an evaluative content of “mental dis-
                                                                                                                                                              
and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the in-
dividual, as described above.” (DSM-IV-TR, p. xxxi) We will return to this criterion below. 
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order” that satisfies the simplicity conditions and the reliability condition to a higher 
degree. In short, as far as the evaluative content of a definition is concerned, there seems 
to be quite a tension between some of the desiderata listed on pp. 18-23 above, e.g. the 
ordinary language condition and the condition of normative adequacy, on the one hand, 
and e.g. the reliability and simplicity conditions, on the other. 
 
(D) There is no need to refer to any particular perspectives or specific standards of 
evaluation – e.g. what the individual himself evaluates as bad and undesirable, or what 
is undesirable “as judged by the standards of the person’s culture” – when defining the 
concept of mental disorder. The crucial thing is whether a condition is bad, not whether 
it is bad from a particular perspective. 
 
This is all I have to say about the value component viewed in isolation. To further de-
termine how well e.g. the harm criterion captures the concept of mental disorder, it is 
necessary to combine it with the idea that the harm in question must have a certain kind 
of internal cause. But in order to do this, we have to get a better grasp of what the rele-
vant kind of internal cause is. But before we turn to this question, let us just take a brief 
look at the connection between the idea that “mental disorder” is an evaluative concept, 
on the one hand, and the idea that the category of mental disorder is socially con-
structed, on the other. How are these two ideas related to each other? 
 
Value-ladenness and social constructionism 
It is sometimes argued that the concept of mental disorder a social construction. Is this a 
plausible view? And how is it related to the idea that the concept is value-laden? 
   To be a social constructionist concerning mental disorder means (roughly) that one 
regards our present category of disorder as socially constructed, i.e. as a human inven-
tion or fabrication. This is an empirical claim that can be divided into the following three 
parts: 
(i) Our present category of mental disorder is created by us rather than “by the 
world”. It is not a “natural category” that reflects the structure of the world itself, 
and we have not discovered it through careful observation of the world “as it is”. 
(ii) Our present category of disorder (which might look “natural” or “unavoidable” 
to some) could well have been different, it is both contingent and arbitrary. 
(iii) The idea that the category is a human invention is often specified in terms of 
how the category has come into existence, and why it continues to exist once it has 
come into existence (why it is stable over time). Here it is often argued that the cate-
gory is not a scientific discovery, but that it is (to a considerable extent) determined 
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by extra-theoretical or extra-scientific factors. For example, it might be argued that 
our present category of disorder is (in part) an outcome of “social and political 
struggles”, or that we need to explain the category in terms of group interests or 
doctor-patient interactions. It seems highly likely that these extra-theoretical or ex-
tra-scientific factors involve evaluations. (Cf. p. 39, esp. footnote 47. Cf. also p. 36.) 
 
However, some constructionists go further than this, and make the following meta-
physical claim (called nominalism): 
(iv) There is no correct or true definition of “mental disorder”. There is no such 
thing as an objective distinction between the pathological and the non-pathological 
that can be discovered e.g. by scientific means (this is not how reality is structured). 
Either there is no sharp distinction between reality and our conceptualizations of it, 
or if there is an external reality that can be distinguished from our conceptualiza-
tions of it, there is no such thing as the single most valid conceptualization of it. And 
even if it happened to be the case that there is some overlap between our present 
category of disorder and certain naturally given categories, it is highly unlikely that 
any of these categories even remotely coincide with our category of mental disorder, 
which suggests that there is no such thing as a natural kind which can correctly be 
labelled “mental disorder”. 
 
The constructionist view is clearly a plausible view of our present category of mental 
disorder.51 This category does not correspond to any natural kind, it has (to a consider-
able degree) been shaped by evaluative considerations, and so on. It also seems plausi-
ble to assume that nominalism is true in this area, and that there is no natural kind that 
even remotely coincides with our present category of mental disorder. 
   There is obviously an intimate connection between the idea that the category of mental 
disorder is socially constructed, on the one hand, and the idea that “mental disorder” is 
an evaluative concept, on the other. So how should this connection be characterized? 
Well, constructionism with regard to the concept of mental disorder (an empirical the-
sis) does not imply that this concept is value laden (a conceptual thesis). However, the 
idea that the concept of mental disorder is actually evaluative seems to provide the best 
explanation of why constructionism is true in this area. Moreover, the idea that this is 
the way it should be (given the purposes of a definition), i.e. that the concept should be 
evaluative, is probably part of the best explanation of why nominalism is true in this 
area. 
                                                 
51 It is worth noting that this does not in any way imply that all or most of our present diagnostic cate-
gories are social constructions. However, the part of reality that can be subsumed under our concept of 
disorder is (in spite of some clustering) probably not very well structured at all, i.e. it might be hard or 
impossible to discover objectively valid diagnostic categories in this area. Cf. Brülde and Tengland
2003, chapter 6. 
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Chapter Four. The factual component. “Machine 
faults” and other internal causes 
 
So, the general idea is not just that a mental disorder is an undesirable condition, but 
also that it is (by definition) caused by the right kind of internal factor. The concept of 
mental disorder is not a purely evaluative concept, it also contains a factual (or explana-
tory) component. But how should this factual component be characterized, what kind of 
internal cause is “essentially” involved in mental disorder? There are at least six possi-
bilities here,52 viz. the following ones: 
(1) The idea that disorders are (or are by definition caused by) lesions, i.e. structural 
or anatomical abnormalities. On this view, a person can only have a disorder if some 
structural part of the organism (like a cell, a tissue, or an organ) is “damaged”. 
(2) The idea that disorders are (or are caused by) part dysfunctions, e.g. physiological 
or biochemical abnormalities or disturbances that may or may not be caused by ana-
tomical abnormalities. There are several different versions of this view, depending 
on what conception of dysfunction that is taken for granted. 
 
These two ideas are both versions of the so-called traditional medical model, or “machine-
fault model”, of disorder. On this view, disorders (e.g. diseases) are regarded as “ma-
chine-faults”, i.e. underlying abnormalities (structural or functional) that tend to cause 
problems on the holistic level. As I see it, this view has two central features: (i) The “re-
ductionist” idea that the symptoms are caused by some kind of “underlying” or “lower-
level” pathology. The machine as a whole does not function because there is a fault 
somewhere in the apparatus, and this is how disorders must (by definition) be ex-
plained. (ii) The view that these machine-faults are abnormalities, i.e. deviations from 
normal structure or function, where normality is understood in terms of species design.  
   One reason why it might be tempting to define “mental disorder” in machine-fault 
terms is probably the phenomenon of clustering, i.e. the fact that symptoms often tend to 
cluster into syndromes.53 In somatic medicine, many syndromes have been explained in 
terms of machine-faults, and this gives us a strong prima facie reason to suspect that 
                                                 
52 These six possibilities are numbered 1, 2a, 2b, 3, 4, and 5. 
53 As Jablensky and Kendell (2002) point out: “Although the range and number of possible aetiological
factors–genetic, toxic, metabolic, or experiential–that may give rise to psychiatric disorders is practi-
cally unlimited, the range of psychopathological syndromes is limited. The paranoid syndrome, the 
obsessive-compulsive syndrome, the depressive syndrome–to mention just a few major symptom clus-
ters–occur with impressive regularity in different individuals and settings, although in each case their
presentation is imprinted by personality and cultural differences.” (p. 7) 
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there is such a thing as an underlying pathology or morphology (as opposed to aetiol-
ogy) in the mental case as well. How else could we explain clustering? 
   Now, as Svensson (1990) points out, there are two fundamentally different versions of 
the “machine-fault model”, viz. “the somaticist approach” and the genuine-mental-
disease approach.  
(a) The somaticist view is “the view that the internal pathology in cases of ‘mental 
disease’ is exactly of the same type as in cases of physical disease, which is to say 
that ‘mental disease’ pathology, just like other pathology, is assumed to consist of 
structural or functional abnormalities of the human organism” (p. 86). On this view, 
the essential internal factor is some kind of neurophysiological or neuroanatomical 
disturbance, or some biochemical abnormality in the brain. 
(b) On the genuine-mental-disease view, “the abnormalities in cases of ‘mental dis-
ease’ are not, and need not be, of an organic nature for them to be correctly concep-
tualized in terms of disease.” (ibid., p. 86). The relevant internal cause (“machine-
fault”) is located in the “mental apparatus” rather than in the “organic apparatus”. 
It is the “psychic machinery” that has broken down, which implies that there is such 
a thing as mental disease sui generis, i.e. purely mental disease. 
 
It is rather obvious that the lesion view is necessarily somaticist, i.e. that it is not really 
compatible with the genuine-mental-disease view. The reason for this is that there are 
no structural abnormalities in the mental realm. There is no mental structure or mental 
anatomy in any literal sense, the mind does not consist of parts which can be damaged.  
   Both the somaticist view and the genuine-mental-disease view can be combined with 
the dysfunction view, however, i.e. there are two possible versions of the dysfunction 
view: (2a) On the somaticist dysfunction view, mental disorders are by definition caused 
by physiological or biochemical abnormalities or disturbances. (2b) On the genuine-
mental-disease version of the dysfunction view, mental disorders are by definition 
caused by underlying mental dysfunctions. 
   These three versions of the traditional medical model – i.e. (1), (2a), and (2b) – all pur-
port to provide a necessary condition of mental disorder. It is normally assumed that 
this necessary condition is an objective criterion, i.e. that it can be objectively (e.g. scien-
tifically) determined whether the condition is satisfied or not.54 However, there are also 
(3) alternative dysfunction views which are not traditional medical views, and 
which do not make this assumption. These views assume instead that the relevant 
                                                 
54 The objective criterion provided by the traditional medical model (e.g. part dysfunction) is always
regarded as a necessary condition by the proponents of this model. Some of these proponents (e.g. 
Boorse) also regards the criterion as sufficient, however, whereas others (e.g. Wakefield) do not. 
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notion of dysfunction is value laden, at least in the epistemic sense (cf. pp. 31-32 
above). 
 
The last two suggestions both presuppose that some kind of harm is necessary for men-
tal disorder:55
(4) the idea that the harmful condition (e.g. disability) has its immediate cause 
within the individual’s mind, i.e. that it is caused by some mental state or process. 
Or more specifically, a mental disorder is a condition that belongs to a type that is 
normally harmful, and where conditions of this type are caused by internal mental 
episodes of another type. Or alternatively put, the relevant mental episode is of a 
type such that most or all instances of this type cause harm (e.g. disability). On this 
view, it is not possible to give any further specification of the kind of internal cause 
that is present when someone has a mental disorder. 
(5) The idea that mental disorders are harmful conditions which are not due to any 
“distinct sustaining cause”. This view is a version of the general idea that disorders 
are internally caused harmful conditions, combined with an analysis of the phrase 
“internally caused”, where a condition is regarded as internally caused if there is an 
absence of a distinct sustaining cause. 
 
Let us now investigate how plausible these suggestions are. The main question that will 
be asked in connection with each suggestion is whether it provides a plausible view of 
what kind of internal cause that is necessary for mental disorder. However, it is also im-
portant to find out, each suggestion, whether it provides a sufficient condition for disor-
der when combined with the undesirability criterion (e.g. the harm criterion). For example, 
the critical assessment of the dysfunction view will be based on the following two ques-
tions: (i) Is dysfunction necessary for disorder? (ii) Is undesirable (e.g. harmful) dysfunc-
tion sufficient for disorder?56 In connection with this, it will also be asked whether the 
dysfunction view gives rise to a category of disorder that is too wide (too inclusive) or 
too narrow (too exclusive). 
 
                                                 
55 That is, no one has ever suggested that the kind of internal causes that (4) and (5) refer to as essential 
are sufficient for disorder.
56 In some of the cases – viz. (1), (2) and possibly (3) – it might also be of some interest to ask whether 
the proposed factual criterion is (in itself) sufficient for mental disorder, e.g. whether dysfunction (with
or without harm) is sufficient for disorder. (Note that this question does not arise in connection with
suggestions (4) and (5), where some kind of undesirability criterion has been incorporated from the 
very beginning.) I have already suggested (cf. the section on the pure scientific approach on pp. 28-29)
that some kind of value criterion is necessary for disorder, but since there are theorists that have
claimed that dysfunction alone is sufficient (e.g. Boorse), I will not avoid the question altogether. 
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1. The lesion view 
On this view, disorders are (or are caused by) lesions, i.e. structural abnormalities or 
disturbances in organs, tissues, or cells. According to Szasz (2000), this is how the con-
cept of disease is actually used in medicine: “Literally, the term disease denotes a demon-
strable lesion of cells, tissues, or organs” (p. 4). However, Szasz does not deny that dis-
eases involve functional abnormalities (disturbed bodily function) as well: 
[T]he medical concept of disease […] denotes a bodily abnormality or somatic pathology, 
that is, a physico-chemical–anatomical or physiological, structural or functional–
alteration of the body deemed to be undesirable. (ibid., p. 4) 
 
He seems to think that all functional disturbances are caused by lesions, though, as 
when he claims that “the basis of all disease is cellular pathology”. 
   One reason why this idea is of no interest in this context is that it strongly suggests, by 
virtue of being a somaticist approach, that there is no such thing as mental disorder. 
Suppose that it is discovered that a condition like schizophrenia is really caused by 
some kind of lesion in the brain. In this case, schizophrenia would probably be regarded 
as a somatic disease rather than as a mental disease. This suggests that if the lesion view 
were true, there would be no mental disorders left, only somatic disorders. Or as Svens-
son (1990) puts it, it would, on this view, be hard to tell how, and why, mental disease 
should be distinguished from physical disease. If the disease that causes behavioural or 
experiential abnormalities is organic by nature, what is mental about it? (p. 87) That is, 
“the somaticist view seems to run the risk of making redundant the notion of mental 
disease. It seems difficult to make clear what is mental about ‘mental disease’ if the pa-
thology of it is a physical pathology.” (ibid., p. 117) 
   Is this likely to happen? It doesn’t seem so. For example, Maj et al (2002) points out  
that [t]hirty years of biological research have not been able to identify a specific bio-
logical marker for any of the current diagnostic categories (and genetic research is 
now providing evidence for the possible existence of vulnerability loci which are 
common to schizophrenia and bipolar disorder). (p. ix) 
 
And according to Jablensky and Kendell (2002), Alzheimer’s disease is one of the few 
conditions appearing in psychiatric classifications where a specific brain morphology 
and a “tentative pathophysiology” have been identified. “Schizophrenia, however, is 
still better described as a syndrome” (p. 6). But regardless of what the future will bring, 
it is obvious that all somaticist views suffer from another weakness, namely that it im-
plies that as long as we haven’t found any underlying pathophysiology, we can’t really 
know whether a mental disorder is present. This seems rather counterintuitive, espe-
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cially if we consider our present level of ignorance (about underlying pathophysiolo-
gies).57
   The lesion view is not plausible in the somatic case either. As Wakefield (1992) points 
out, the existence of a lesion is neither necessary nor sufficient for disorder. “There are 
physical disorders […] for which there are no known anatomical lesions”, and “a lesion 
can be a harmless abnormality that is not a disorder” (p. 375).58 For a lesion to constitute 
(or contribute to) a disorder, it needs to have a negative effect on function, which in turn 
has harmful effects on the organism as a whole. This strongly suggests that we should 
specify the factual component of the concept of disorder in functional rather than struc-
tural terms, i.e. in terms of dysfunction.59
 
2. Disorder as “part” dysfunction (or harmful dysfunction) 
On the dysfunction view, disorders are, by definition, caused by “part dysfunctions”. 
That is, the underlying abnormality (“machine-fault”, pathology, or deviation from spe-
cies design) is functional rather than structural, which is not to deny that the reduced 
function is, in most cases, due to some structural abnormality. 
   The part dysfunctions that are essentially involved in mental disorder are, it seems, 
either biological (e.g. biochemical or neurophysiological) or mental (as in the case of a 
genuine underlying psychopathology). This suggests that the relevant dysfunctions 
cannot really be behavioural, as is claimed in DSM-IV.60 Such a claim is not quite in 
harmony with the central idea that a disorder can only be present if something has gone 
wrong with the organism’s internal functioning, and that this internal dysfunction ex-
                                                 
57 On the assumption that at least some of the conditions that are currently regarded as pathological are
reasonably regarded as such, that is. At this point, it is worth pointing out that the lesion view can, if 
combined with the fact that very few “pathophysiologies” have been identified, give some support to
the idea that all or most of the conditions that are currently regarded as mental disorders are not really
disorders at all. This is probably one reason why the lesion view is so attractive to an anti-psychiatrist
like Szasz. 
58 A definition that combines the lesion view with some kind of undesirability criterion doesn’t just fail
to satisfy the ordinary language condition; it is also lacking in normative adequacy. However, a defini-
tion of this kind would satisfy most of the other conditions of adequacy quite well, including the value 
condition (a condition that would not be satisfied if the existence of a lesion were, instead, regarded as 
sufficient for disorder). 
59 Wakefield (1992) also criticizes Szasz’s idea of how lesions can be identified, viz. by statistical
means. The recognition of a lesion is not simply a matter of observing anatomical deviance. To recog-
nize “a statistical deviation from a typical anatomical structure” as a lesion is also to recognize that this 
deviation impairs the ability of the particular structure to accomplish the functions that it was designed
to perform (“part dysfunction”). Again, it is concluded that the concept of lesion is irrelevant unless it is 
conceived of as a functional concept. 
60 DSM-IV's definition of “mental disorder” contains the idea that “[w]hatever its original cause, it [a
disorder] must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction in the individual.” (DSM-IV-TR, p. xxxi, my italics) 
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plains the symptoms that can be observed on the level of the organism as a whole (e.g. 
the behavioural level). We should not forget that the dysfunction view is a “reduction-
ist” view, which assumes that the machine as a whole does not function because there is 
a functional fault somewhere in the apparatus. As Wakefield (2000a) points out, 
[f]unction and dysfunction in the medical sense refer, in the first instance, not to the 
quality of the person’s performance in a given environment but to whether the 
mechanisms within the person are performing or failing to perform the functions 
they were designed to perform. (p. 20) 
 
It is also important to note that the term “part” is “used here in a very broad sense to 
encompass hierarchically organized levels of physical and mental structure and func-
tion. For example, cells and organs are parts, but systems of interacting organs (e.g., the 
digestive system) are also parts that have functions corresponding to their level of de-
scription.” (ibid., p. 25) 
   Another important feature of most dysfunction views is the idea that abnormal part 
functioning needs to be specified in terms of deviations from species design. Every spe-
cies has a natural design, a species-typical design, which comprises the hierarchy of in-
terlocking functional systems that supports the life of organisms of that type. As Svens-
son (1990) formulates this view, 
a [somatic] disease [dysfunction] is said to be present when some part of the body 
fails to perform its […] species-typical contribution to the life-processes of the organ-
ism. […] There is a ‘natural order’, a plan of organization developed through natural 
evolution, of the human organism, and diseases [dysfunctions] are deviations from 
this ‘species-design’ (p. 93). 
 
Svensson also adds that ascriptions of dysfunctions are, on this view, not regarded as 
evaluative, but as objective statement of facts (ibid., p. 93). 
   In short, part dysfunctions are underlying functional abnormalities, internal functional 
deviations from species-design, which can explain e.g. why a person is not functioning 
well on the holistic level. This is not very informative, however, i.e. it seems that the no-
tion of dysfunction is in need of further clarification. The central question is of course 
what (exactly) a dysfunction is, i.e. how the concept of dysfunction should be defined. 
However, we also need to know how dysfunctions should be identified, i.e. how we can 
and should determine whether a dysfunction is present (assuming that it might not be 
possible to apply the definition in a straight-forward way; cf. the reliability condition). 
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Two medical conceptions of dysfunction 
There are at least two traditional medical views on what a dysfunction is, and on how 
we should determine whether a dysfunction is present, views which (if accepted) give 
rise to two different conceptions of disorder (somatic as well as mental disorder). 
 
(i) On the first of these two views, the concept of dysfunction is analyzed in terms of 
biological disadvantage, where the notion of biological disadvantage is understood in evo-
lutionary terms, viz. in terms of reduced survival or lowered reproductive fitness.61 On 
this view, a biological function of a part or process is its ultimate contribution to sur-
vival and reproduction, e.g. that a part of an organism functions normally means that it 
contributes to survival and reproduction (reproductive fitness) with at least typical effi-
ciency (cf. Wakefield 1992). A dysfunction is present if a part or process does not con-
tribute survival or reproductive fitness in this way. If this notion of dysfunction is in-
corporated into the concept of disorder, we get the idea that a disorder is (roughly) a 
condition that reduces longevity or fertility. 
   This view is normally accompanied by the idea that dysfunctions are (as a rule) statis-
tical abnormalities, e.g. that it can be established statistically whether a certain part per-
forms its function or not. Now, it is not quite clear whether this should be understood as 
part of the definition of “dysfunction”, or “merely” as a highly useful (and perhaps nec-
essary) way to determine whether a dysfunction is present (cf. the distinction between 
the definitional and epistemic senses of “value laden” on pp. 31-32 above). That is, it is 
not clear whether dysfunctions are, by definition, statistical functional abnormalities 
that have detrimental effects on survival or reproduction, or whether dysfunctions are, 
by definition, abnormalities which have detrimental effects on survival or reproduction, 
where these abnormalities can be (or even have to be) established statistically. In any 
case, the idea is that we can gain knowledge about e.g. the species design of a certain 
organ by empirically establishing the statistically normal functioning of this organ (for a 
certain sex and age group), and that we can therefore (at least to some extent) determine 
what conditions are pathological through statistical methods. It might also be argued 
that there is no other way in which we can (in practice) determine this. 
 
(ii) The second view of dysfunction (Wakefield’s view) is also inspired by evolutionary 
theory. Here, a dysfunction is (roughly) regarded as a failure of some internal mecha-
                                                 
61 It seems that this view was first formulated by Scadding in 1967. In his view, to have a disease is
(roughly) to ”differ from the norm of the species in such a way as to […] [be placed] at a biological
disadvantage” (Kendell 2002, p. 112). Scadding ”never explained what he meant by biological disad-
vantage”, however, “but Kendell (1975) and Bourse [sic] (1975) both argued that it must at least en-
compass reduced fertility and life expectancy” (ibid., p. 112). Kendell also argued that for a disorder to 
be present, the disadvantage must be due to innate or intrinsic factors. It is worth noting that this view
was originally intended as an analysis of “disease” rather than “dysfunction”. I don’t think it is very 
problematic to regard it as a theory of dysfunction, however.
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nism to perform its natural function, the function for which it was designed by nature, 
i.e. by evolution. According to Wakefield (1992), a 
natural function of an organ or other mechanism is an effect of the organ or mecha-
nism that enters into an explanation of the existence, structure, or activity of the or-
gan or mechanism. (p. 382).  
 
The explanation that Wakefield has in mind is obviously explanation by natural selec-
tion. However, it is not quite clear whether the reference to evolutionary explanation 
and natural selection should be regarded as part of the definition of “dysfunction”. Con-
sider Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of disorder as it was formulated in 
Wakefield (1992): 
A condition is a disorder if and only if (a) the condition causes some harm or depri-
vation of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of the person’s culture 
(the value criterion), and (b) the condition results from the inability of some internal 
mechanism to perform its natural function, wherein a natural function is an effect 
that is part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and structure of the 
mechanism (the explanatory criterion). (p. 384)62
 
Here, it sounds as if “natural function” (and hence, “dysfunction”) is defined in evolu-
tionary terms. However, it is quite clear that Wakefield (2000a) rejects this interpreta-
tion, e.g. when he claims that “[i]t is a scientific discovery, not a conceptual truth, that 
functions exist because of natural selection” (p. 39), something which allows him to say 
that his notion of function is no different from Harvey’s (who didn’t have a clue about 
natural selection). 
   In any case, Wakefield still believes that every disorder originates in a “mechanism 
with a natural selection history”, and that “there must be at least one malfunctioning 
system responsible for every disorder” (Murphy and Woolfolk 2000a, p. 242). This sug-
gests that the term “dysfunction” is “a scientific and factual term based in evolutionary 
biology” (Wakefield 1992, p. 374), and that dysfunctions (natural functions, and mecha-
nisms) can, at least in principle, be objectively identified. However, Wakefield (2000a) 
does not deny that value judgements often play a critical role in identifying functions in 
practice. The reason why this is possible is that the prototypical functions are benefi-
                                                 
62 That is, dysfunction is, on Wakefield’s view, necessary but not sufficient for disorder. A dysfunction
(as delineated by evolutionary theory) can only be (or cause) a disorder if it the cause of significant
harm to the person under present environmental circumstances and according to present cultural stan-
dards (cf. Wakefield 1992, pp. 383-384). That’s why albinism, reversal of heart position, and fused toes 
are not considered disorders. 
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cial.63 This does not mean that “function” is a value term, however. To attribute a func-
tion to a mechanism is not to make a positive evaluation of it. Some functions may even 
be harmful in our present environment, e.g. the taste for fat.64
 
These are the two most common medical conceptions of dysfunction. On both these 
views, “function” and “dysfunction” are factual concepts that can be analyzed entirely 
in non-evaluative and objective terms. According to Wakefield (2000a), both views are 
also “essentialist views”, since they assume that “function” is a scientific concept, and 
scientific concepts have essentialist structures (p. 28). However, it is also possible to de-
fine the concept of dysfunction without any reference to either evolution or biological 
disadvantage, but it is not likely that such a conception of dysfunction would be value-
free. (We will return to this third possibility on pp. 66-67 below.) But before this, we 
have to take a closer (critical) look at the two essentialist conceptions of dysfunction, and 
at the idea that dysfunction (defined in any of these ways) is necessary for mental disor-
der. 
   But first of all, we need to clarify what a  mental dysfunction is, both in more general 
terms and more specifically, i.e. given the two “essentialist” definitions of “dysfunction” 
that have just been offered. The main reason for this emphasis on the mental is (as we 
have already seen in connection with the lesion view) that all somaticist versions of the 
“machine-fault” model makes it hard to see what is mental about “mental disorder”. Or 
as Wakefield (1992) points out, it is not the kind of symptoms that makes a disorder 
mental. “[F]or a disorder to be mental, there must be a mental dysfunction, although the 
mental dysfunction might be secondary to a physiological dysfunction.” (p. 384) This 
suggests that genuine mental disorder can only be present if the underlying pathology is 
of a mental kind, and that the only approach worth taking seriously in this context is the 
genuine-mental-disease approach.65
                                                 
63 This observation partly explains (together with e.g. the claim about Harvey above) why Wakefield
has added condition (b) below to his 1992 definition of “natural function”. Wakefield (2000a) defines
the concept as follows: “An effect of a feature of an organism is a natural function of the feature if the
effect (a) causally explains the existence, maintenance in the species, or detailed structure of the feature 
of which it is an effect, and (b) it explains the feature via the same essential processes by which the
base set of non-accidental beneficial effects of eyes, hands, and so on [e.g. eyes seeing, hands grasp-
ing], explain the mechanisms that give rise to them.” (p. 36) 
64 Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) seems to believe that Wakefield resorts to local cultural standards 
about what constitutes normal behaviour to identify dysfunctions, at least in the mental case. On their 
view, Wakefield thinks we can identify a malfunctioning mental mechanism by relying on indirect evi-
dence that indicates or correlates with the existence of internal dysfunction, e.g. by recognizing that
certain responses are not normal, expectable, proportionate or appropriate. They also ascribe to him the
view “that value-free judgments of appropriate or normal behavior can not only be made, but will turn
out to be correlative with a sophisticated evolutionary ecologist’s objective view of behavior produced
by malfunction.” (p. 250) We will return to this criticism later. 
65 It is also possible to argue that “[m]ental maladies are distinguished from physical maladies primar-
ily by the types of symptoms or evils that characterize them” (Culver and Gert 1982, p. 88, my italics). 
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 The genuine-mental-disease approach: What is a mental dysfunction? 
On the genuine-mental-disease version of the dysfunction view, mental disorders are, 
by definition, caused by underlying mental “part dysfunctions”. This view is just as 
“reductionist” as its somaticist counterpart, i.e. the relevant functional abnormalities are 
conceived of as mental “machine-faults” located somewhere in the “mental apparatus” 
or “psychic machinery”. Moreover, these mental dysfunctions are regarded as (func-
tional) deviations from the species-design of the mind. 
   This gives rise to a number of questions. The central question is of course what (ex-
actly) a mental dysfunction is, and how we should determine whether a dysfunction is 
present. What is a mental function, and what mental functions are there? What is it that 
can function or malfunction, i.e. what are “the carriers” of mental functions? What are 
the parts of the psychic machinery, what does the mind (viewed as a “machine”) consist 
of? Can minds malfunction in the same way as diseased bodies malfunction?66 Is there a 
species-design of the mind that can be established in an objective and value-neutral 
way? 
   To view the mind functionally (as a “mental apparatus”) is to view it as a functional 
(or multifunctional) system that consists of a number of lower-level “interlocking” 
(multi)functional systems (and so on).67 The “ultimate parts” of the psychic machinery 
are (to use another mechanical metaphor) mental mechanisms. If the mind is viewed not 
just functionally but also in a reductionist manner, it is (ultimately) mechanisms or 
processes that have functions, and that can function or malfunction. The function of a 
mechanism is (very roughly) what it does for the organism, e.g. the contribution it 
makes to the survival and reproduction of this organism. A more precise account is (as 
we have seen) given by Wakefield (1992). On his view, a natural function of a mechanism 
is “an effect of the […] mechanism that enters into an explanation of the existence, struc-
ture, or activity of the […] mechanism” (p. 382), e.g. what it has been designed to do by 
evolution.  
                                                                                                                                                              
(This view is characterized more at length in footnote 94 on p. 71 below.) The main objection to this
alternative view is that it implies, somewhat counterintuitively, that psychosomatic disorders are not
mental disorders. 
66 Or as Svensson (1990) puts it: Are there any mental functions that are relevantly similar or analo-
gous to bodily functions, and if there are such mental functional entities, can they malfunction or break 
down in the same sense as that e.g. a diseased bodily organ malfunctions? (p. 117) 
67 As Murphy and Woolfolk (2000b) point out, human beings admit of description at several psycho-
logical levels, e.g. there is a distinction between the computational and algorithmic levels of the visual 
system, and the mind can also be described on an intentional level, i.e. in terms of beliefs and desires 
(p. 277). Cf. also Dennett 1987, chapter 1. 
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   The reductionism mentioned above68 does not in any way imply that different mental 
mechanisms can be regarded in isolation. Instead, it is worth emphasizing that 
[m]ental mechanisms like those involved in perception, motivation, emotion, lin-
guistic ability, and cognition play distinctive but coordinated roles in overall mental 
functioning, much as different organs play distinctive but coordinated roles in 
physical functioning. (Wakefield 1992, p. 378) 
 
Moreover, the different mental mechanisms have (e.g. like organs) 
such strikingly beneficial effects and depend on such complex and harmonious in-
teractions that the effects cannot be entirely accidental. Thus, functional explana-
tions of mental mechanisms are sometimes justified by what we know about how 
people manage to survive and reproduce. (ibid., p. 383) 
 
It is important to notice that “[o]ne mechanism can have many functions, and one func-
tion can be performed by an interaction of many mechanisms.” (Wakefield 2000b, p. 
267) That a dysfunction is present means that some function is not performed by the 
mechanism (or mechanisms) that is designed to perform this function, and not necessar-
ily that some mechanism has broken down. That is, the notion of dysfunction should 
(strictly speaking) be understood in terms of “failed functions, not failed mechanisms 
per se” (ibid., p. 267). 
   At this point, it is worth noting out that all this talk about mental mechanisms and 
mental systems does not in any way suggest that there are free-floating mental mecha-
nisms, or that these mental mechanisms occur in some kind of soul or mental substance. 
Instead, it seems reasonable to assume that mental mechanisms are nothing but proc-
esses and activities that take place in the brain. On this view (which is normally called 
token physicalism, or the token identity theory), every mental occurrence (or token) is 
identical with a physical occurrence (token) in the brain. But doesn’t this view imply 
that we need to accept the somaticist view of mental disorder after all? Or is there a 
principled way in which we can distinguish mental from physical mechanisms, an ac-
count of mental mechanisms that would (so to speak) save the genuine-mental-disorder 
view? 
   Well, it seems so. The genuine-mental-disorder view is not really threatened by the 
idea that concrete mental events are identical with brain events. The important thing is 
that there is no type-type identity between the mental and the physical, i.e. that the rele-
vant types of mental mechanisms do not correspond to types of brain mechanisms in any 
simple way. If there is no such correspondence, there might be mentalistically defined 
                                                 
68 This “explanatory” type of reductionism should be carefully distinguished from the kind of ontologi-
cal reductionism which claims that the psychological can be reduced to the physical, i.e. materialism.
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disease-types that do not coincide with any physiologically defined disease-type (cf. 
Svensson 1990). So, is there any reason to believe that (type) physicalism (or the type 
identity theory) is true, i.e. that all mental occurrences of a certain (mental) type are also 
of the same physical or neurological type? Not really. It has been pointed out by many 
theorists that it is highly unlikely that every type of mental event is also a type of neuro-
logical event, e.g. that all occurrences of pain have some physical property in common 
(in virtue of which they belong to the category “pain”. The fact that the type identity 
theory is most probably false allows for the possibility that the brains of patients who 
share the same “mental disease” do not show any distinctive neurological similarity, 
which suggests that the disease in question must be defined in mental rather than 
physiological terms (cf. Svensson 1990, pp. 91-92). 
   Is there any reason to believe that the genuine-mental-disorder view is threatened by 
the more plausible functional identity thesis, or functionalism? According to this view, 
mental states are functional states. What all mental states of a certain type (e.g. all pains) 
have in common is their causal role in the system as a whole, and the only reason why a 
certain particular occurrence belongs to a certain mental state type (e.g. what makes it a 
case of pain) is that it has the causal role that states of that type (e.g. pains) have. This is 
really a claim about how mental states should be individuated, specified, or defined, 
viz. that they should be defined by “a triplet of relations: what typically causes them, 
what effects they have on other mental states, and what effects they have on behaviour.” 
(Blackburn 1994, p. 150; cf. also e.g. Block (ed.) 1980-81, Stich 1983)69 Blackburn also ob-
serves that 
[f]unctionalism is often compared with descriptions of a computer, since according 
to it mental descriptions correspond to a description of a machine in terms of soft-
ware, that remains silent about the underlying hardware or ‘realization’ of the pro-
gram the machine is running. (ibid., p. 150). 
 
The last sentence indicates that functionalism is neutral with regard to the nature of the 
mental occurrences (tokens), which implies that it is compatible with the token identity 
theory characterized above.70
   If we assume that functionalism and the token identity theory are both true, this seems 
to suggest that it is primarily functions (types of functions) and dysfunctions that can be 
mental, and that it doesn’t make much sense to attribute mentality to the mechanisms 
                                                 
69 It is an open question to what extent our ordinary mental terms (e.g. “belief”, “pain”, or “shame”)
refer to such functional types, but in my view, it seems likely that most of our actual mental terms are
not functional in this sense. If they were, our so-called folk theory of the mind would be close to per-
fect, but it isn’t. 
70 The idea that there are functional systems that have non-physical realizations, e.g. that the underly-
ing hardware is purely mental, is a rather strange view in this day and age. It is not incompatible with
functionalism, however. 
 55  
which have (or carry) these functions. As far as I can see, this view implies that there is 
really no difference between (types of) mental functions and dysfunctions, on the one 
hand, and (types of) brain functions and dysfunctions, on the other, at least as long as 
we have the higher levels of organization in mind. The question is whether or not this 
constitutes a threat to the genuine-mental-disorder view. Is it necessary to assume that 
there is no type-type correlation between mental dysfunctions and higher brain dys-
functions in order to avoid the somaticist view (physical reductionism)? My tentative 
answer is “no”, i.e. it seems to me that functionalism is compatible with the idea that 
there is such a thing as genuine mental disorders.71
   The characterization of mental mechanisms and their functions that has been given so 
far is pretty abstract. To clarify the relevant notions further, we need some concrete ex-
amples of mental mechanisms and mental functions. What mental functions are there, 
and how can we establish what functions there are? 
   At this point, it might be tempting to believe that our ordinary psychological terms 
refer to such mechanisms or functions. For example, it might be assumed that cognition, 
emotion, perception, belief, desire, motivation, and memory are types of mental mecha-
nisms or functions. On such a common sense view, appropriate fear might be viewed as 
a function of some affective fear-generating mechanism, and false or irrational beliefs 
might be viewed as failures of the belief-generating mechanism to perform the function 
that it has been designed to perform, i.e. as mental dysfunctions. Wakefield (1992) some-
times seems to endorse this view, e.g. when he tells us that cognitive, motivational, af-
fective, personological, hedonic, linguistic, and behavioral dispositions and structures 
are examples of mental mechanisms that have functions (p. 375).  
   We should resist this common sense temptation, mainly because it tacitly accepts the 
so-called “folk theory” of the mind, which is a bad theory. First, it seems to assume that 
the mind is a collection of discrete mental faculties, and that our mental life can be ex-
plained in terms of these faculties. Such “faculty psychology” is not plausible, how-
ever.72 An important reason for this is that such a theory can’t really explain very much. 
To claim that someone hallucinates because the perceptual mechanism fails to perform 
its function, or that someone suffers from a total lack of motivation because the desire-
function has broken down, is just as uninformative as the claim that sleeping pills causes 
sleep because of their dormative powers. 
                                                 
71 We may also ask whether functionalism is true, e.g. whether it is plausible to “see mental similarity
only when there is causal similarity” (Blackburn 1994, p. 151). I will not deal with this problem here,
though.
72 According to Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a), “[f]aculty psychology is the view that the heterogene-
ity of our mental life must be explained by the existence of distinct psychological mechanisms” (p. 251, 
footnote 5). This suggests that there are many possible faculty psychologies besides our folk psychol-
ogy, e.g. many other versions of the view “that the mind is a collection of discrete, multifarious mecha-
nisms that make distinctive contributions to overall functioning.” (ibid., p. 242) In fact, a rather large
number of such theories can be found all through the history of philosophy.
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   A related reason why we should the reject the common sense faculty view is that the 
distinction between “part functions” and holistic functioning collapses if this view is 
accepted. The dysfunction view is based on the assumption that there is a difference be-
tween the two levels, and that manifest disabilities (on the holistic level) can be explained 
in terms of underlying part dysfunctions. But if we think of failures in perception, cogni-
tion or emotion as part dysfunctions, this idea is no longer valid. Moreover, if we think 
of underlying pathologies in this common sense manner, it seems that they can no 
longer be identified in a value-free way. Consider the case of abnormal motivation. It is 
not just that such motivations are manifest rather than underlying, the abnormality in 
question is also the wrong kind of abnormality, i.e. it is more like abnormal behaviour 
(where the abnormality is evaluative) than abnormal biological functioning (where it is 
not). 
   This suggests that what we need in order to identify the mental mechanisms and their 
functions is a well-elaborated functional theory or model of the mental “apparatus”, an 
explanatory model of the human mind which refers to mental structures, mechanisms 
and functions in a way that does not involve any reference to the manifest behaviours or 
emotions that we want such a theory to explain. On this view, mental mechanisms and 
their functions are theoretical constructs that figure in plausible explanatory theories (or 
maybe just the best theory?) of the human mind. Examples of the kind of theoretical 
constructs that are needed can be found in Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, which in-
cludes mental structures (with functions) like the Superego, the Ego, and the Id, as well 
as defence mechanisms, like e.g. repression.73 Other examples are the learning mecha-
nisms to which the behavioural theory refers and constructs like “the impulse control 
function” (that tends to fail in e.g. psychopaths). 
   The problem with this more sophisticated theoretical account of mental mechanisms, 
functions and dysfunctions is that there is no such thing as a generally accepted theory 
in this field. And even if a theory like psychoanalysis would win eventually (it is the 
most promising attempt according to e.g. Boorse and Wakefield), it might be hard to 
apply in practice in order to determine whether a mental dysfunction is present, e.g. 
because there are too few observational criteria (cf. the reliability condition). 
   This concludes the section on what a mental dysfunction is, and how such dysfunction 
might be identified. Let us now return to two essentialist conceptions of dysfunction 
that were characterized above. Do any of these two views offer a satisfactory account of 
what a mental dysfunction is, and is it reasonable to assume that mental dysfunction 
(defined in any of these ways) is necessary for mental disorder? And do any of the 
views succeed in showing us how mental dysfunctions can be identified (in a value-free 
                                                 
73 Wakefield (1992) uses Freud’s repression account of neurotic disorder as an example of what this
type of mental dysfunction account might work. Repression is a mechanism that sometimes fails to 
perform its function (what it was designed to do) in a satisfactory way, and when this happens, the per-
son might become neurotic 
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way)? I will not restrict myself entirely to the mental case, however. The reason for this 
is that the dysfunction views of disorder offered by e.g. Boorse, Kendell, and Wakefield 
purport to define the generic concept of disorder, i.e. not just “mental disorder”, but also 
“somatic disorder”. 
 
Dysfunctions as statistical abnormalities which give rise to biological 
disadvantage 
On the first “essentialist” view of dysfunction, dysfunctions are either (by definition) 
statistical functional abnormalities that have detrimental effects on survival or reproduc-
tive fitness, or they are (by definition) functional abnormalities that have detrimental 
effects on survival or reproduction, where it is assumed that these abnormalities can (or 
must) be identified by statistical methods. If this notion of dysfunction is incorporated 
into the concept of disorder, we get the idea that a disorder is (at least in part) a condi-
tion that reduces longevity or fertility, and that is caused by a statistically establishable 
functional abnormality. Is this a plausible view of disorder in general, and of mental 
disorder in particular? 
   Let us first look at the statistical component (assuming that it is part of the definition 
of “dysfunction” and not merely a means to identify dysfunctions). It is easy to see that 
the presence of a dysfunction or abnormality cannot be established on purely statistical 
grounds, e.g. we cannot distinguish between positive and negative abnormalities 
(above-par and sub-par functioning) in this way. That is, statistic abnormality is not suf-
ficient. But it doesn’t seem to be necessary either, since a purely statistical criterion 
would make it conceptually impossible that the majority of a reference group suffers 
from a disease, i.e. the majority would be “debarred from being regarded as ill” (cf. 
Wakefield 1992). It has also been suggested, e.g. by Wakefield (1992) that a purely statis-
tical criterion can “not distinguish between disadvantage due to dysfunction of internal 
mechanisms and disadvantage due to harmful environments” (p. 379). 
   Now, this criticism can clearly be avoided if there is no reference to statistical abnor-
mality in the definition of “disorder”, and if the relevant statistics are, instead, regarded 
as one of several means to identify dysfunctions. So, is it more plausible to define “dis-
order” solely in terms of (internally caused) biological disadvantage? We have already 
seen that reduced survival or reproduction is not sufficient for disorder (cf. p. 28 above). 
So, is it more plausible to assume that reduced survival or reproduction is necessary for 
disorder? It doesn’t seem so. There are clearly a large number of e.g. harmful conditions 
that we intuitively classify as mental disorders that might not reduce fertility or longev-
ity at all, like e.g. different phobias.74 What these examples suggest is that it is more cru-
                                                 
74 To conceive of reduced survival or reproduction as sufficient for disorder doesn’t just fail to satisfy
the ordinary language condition. Such a conception of disorder also fails to satisfy the value condition
(there are many things besides reduced survival or reproduction that are bad for an individual), the con-
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cial whether a condition causes harm than whether it has detrimental effects on survival 
or reproduction in our present environment (which is a rather specific type of harm). As 
Wakefield (1992) points out, 
the biological disadvantage approach mistakenly uses decreased longevity and fer-
tility in the present environment as the criterion for mechanism dysfunction. The 
fact that the organism’s mechanisms were originally selected because they increased 
longevity and fertility in a past environment does not imply that some mechanism is 
malfunctioning when longevity and fertility decrease in the present environment. 
(p. 379) 
 
He also adds that “[i]t is the failure of specific mechanisms to perform their assigned 
tasks, rather than lowered fitness in itself, that shows that something has gone wrong 
with the organism.” (ibid., p. 379) So, let us now try to find out if Wakefield’s own ver-
sion of the dysfunction view is more plausible. 
 
Dysfunctions as failures to perform natural functions 
On Wakefield’s conception of dysfunction, a dysfunction is a failure of some internal 
mechanism to perform its natural function, where a natural function of a mechanism is 
(roughly) an effect of this mechanism that explains why it was naturally selected. If this 
notion of dysfunction is incorporated into the concept of disorder as a necessary condi-
tion, we get the idea that a condition cannot be a disorder unless “the condition results 
from the inability of some internal mechanism to perform its natural function” (Wake-
field 1992, p. 384). 
   Now, on Wakefield’s view, a disorder cannot be mental unless it is caused by a mental 
dysfunction, i.e. unless it results from the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a 
natural function for which it was designed by evolution (ibid., p. 373).75 That is, it is as-
                                                                                                                                                              
dition of normative adequacy (it doesn’t give us any plausible normative guidance at all), and the reli-
ability condition (it is sometimes hard to determine whether a certain condition is associated with bio-
logical disadvantage in the relevant sense). To conceive of reduced survival or reproduction as neces-
sary for disorder, e.g. to define “mental disorder” as harmful dysfunction (where dysfunction is defined 
in terms of reduced survival or reproduction) is more plausible, due to the value component. Such a
conception also suffers from certain defects, however. Apart from the fact that it fails to satisfy the
ordinary language condition, it gives us bad normative guidance (e.g. it would be implausible to require
that a condition is associated with reduced survival or reproduction in order to treat it), and it is as unre-
liable as the idea that reduced survival or reproduction is sufficient for disorder.
75 Wakefield’s (1992) full analysis of mental disorder is a straight-forward application of his harmful
dysfunction analysis of disorder in general (see p. 51 above) to the mental case: “A condition is a men-
tal disorder if and only if (a) the condition causes some harm or deprivation of benefit to the person as
judged by the standards of the person’s culture (the value criterion), and (b) the condition results from
the inability of some mental mechanism to perform its natural function, wherein a natural function is an 
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sumed that mental mechanisms and processes have natural functions, i.e. that they can 
be naturally selected in the same way as e.g. organs have been selected (cf. ibid., p. 375). 
As Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) put it, Wakefield is “an empirical adaptationist about 
the mind”, he believes “that human psychology, like human physiology, is a product of 
natural selection”, and “that the mind consists of mechanisms designed by natural selec-
tion” (p. 242).76
   Wakefield’s evolutionary view has been criticized by many writers, e.g. by Lilienfeld 
and Marino 1995, Murphy and Woolfolk 2000a, 2000b, and Nordenfelt 2003. Most of the 
objections to Wakefield’s theory purport to show that dysfunction (as defined by Wake-
field) is not a necessary condition for mental disorder, i.e. that someone may well suffer 
from a mental disorder even when there is no “evolutionary malfunction”. Some of 
these arguments try to establish (1) that “many mental functions are not direct evolu-
tionary adaptations, but rather adaptively neutral by-products of adaptations” 
(Lilienfeld and Marino 1995), and that some disorders are failures with regard to these 
functions rather than with regard to natural functions. That is, the idea is that disorders 
can be caused by mechanisms that have no adaptive function. Other arguments of this 
type (2) purport to establish that mental disorders can even be caused by mechanisms 
that are working exactly as designed by evolution, e.g. that “many consensual disorders 
represent evolutionary adaptive reactions to danger or loss” (ibid.). 
   It is also possible, however, to (3) criticize the idea that dysfunctions (natural func-
tions, and mechanisms) can be objectively identified. That is, it can be argued that in the 
absence of an established evolutionary science of the mind, Wakefield’s concept of men-
tal disorder is almost impossible to apply, and that we therefore have to rely on value 
judgements (e.g. intuitions about what responses are normal, expectable, proportionate 
or appropriate) to identify the relevant mental mechanisms and to recognize when they 
malfunction.77 This is a striking argument, but it may not be as strong as it seems. First, 
                                                                                                                                                              
effect that is part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and structure of the mental mecha-
nism (the explanatory criterion).” (p. 385)
76 According to Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a), Wakefield “goes further; he assumes that the mind is a
collection of discrete, multifarious mechanisms that make distinctive contributions to overall function-
ing.” (p. 242) It is somewhat doubtful whether he actually believes this, however. See p. 54 above.
77 This is how Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) argue, e.g. when they claim that “in the absence of some
capacity to discern the natural kinds or psychological essences that Wakefield presumes, there is no 
way to identify a class of dysfunctional mental phenomena without engaging in some form of value 
judgment. Inevitably, we must start out with what we already think of as pathological […].” (pp. 250-
51). Now, on their view, we can only draw the line between the pathological and the non-pathological if
we are able to discriminate normal, proportionate and appropriate responses from abnormal, dispropor-
tionate and inappropriate ones. But how do we decide e.g. whether a certain situation warrants a de-
pressive reaction? According to Murphy and Woolfolk, we cannot do this without recourse to some
evaluative standard of normality: “We believe that the methods Wakefield thinks are required to apply
the concept of dysfunction will inevitably incorporate judgments of moral and aesthetic value, because 
they can be applied only against a background of shared values about normal behavior.” (ibid., p. 247)
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it does not, unlike (1) and (2), concern Wakefield’s definition of “mental disorder”. It 
does not focus “on the ontological or definitional question of the nature of function and 
dysfunction but on the epistemological question of how we come to judge that a condi-
tion involves a dysfunction” (Wakefield 2000b, p. 264). Second, it seems reasonable to 
assume that we, in practice, often have to rely on judgements of disorder to determine 
whether or not a dysfunction is present, and I don’t think anyone would deny that value 
judgements often play a critical role when we decide that a certain condition is a disor-
der, i.e. that “values and local norms may [actually] influence such judgments in a vari-
ety of ways” (ibid., pp. 264-265). The important thing here is not whether judgments of 
dysfunction are actually objective, however, but whether they can be objective, i.e. 
“whether an appeal to values is intrinsic to the logic of the evidence for such judg-
ments.” (ibid., p. 264) And to settle this question, it is not sufficient to point out that our 
actual judgements of dysfunction can often be explained in terms of “local values and 
norms” or “socially constructed criteria of normality”. In fact, and this is the third point, 
it seems plausible to assume that if Wakefield’s analysis of dysfunction is correct, then 
dysfunctions can (in principle) be identified objectively.78 (This is not to say that disor-
ders can be identified objectively, however, at least not if the harmful dysfunction analy-
sis of disorder is correct.) As Wakefield himself puts it, even when our judgements of 
design are in fact influenced by local values, this does not in any way imply that these 
judgments themselves are “constituted, even in part, by such values. The truth or falsity 
of the judgments about design […] are in principle factual and independent of the val-
ues that influenced them” (ibid., p. 265).79
   Let us now take a closer look at the more serious objections, e.g. arguments of type (1) 
and (2). However, there will be a more thorough discussion of these arguments in Ra-
dovic (forthcoming), and I will therefore be somewhat brief here. 
 
(1) The arguments in the first group purport to show that mental disorders can be 
caused by failed mechanisms that have no adaptive function, e.g. by spandrels, exapta-
tions, or vestigal parts (or free riders). Consider the case of spandrels, i.e. “adventitious 
by-products of the development of other traits” that “themselves have never possessed 
any adaptive function” (Murphy and Woolfolk 2000a, p. 243). 
If mental spandrels exist, then there are mental mechanisms that are the by-products 
of evolution but have themselves never possessed adaptive functions (in Wake-
field’s evolutionary sense) and, therefore, could not malfunction [in the relevant 
                                                 
78 Even Murphy and Woolfolk (2000b) admit that malfunction, in the evolutionary sense, is an objec-
tive notion, and that it is possible to determine an evolutionary malfunction objectively. As we will 
soon see, they don’t think this is the correct notion of dysfunction, however.
79 He also believes “that we often correct our views of disorder when we learn about the cross-cultural
evidence, even if this goes against our own values”, and that this alleged fact constitutes “[o]ne power-
ful piece of evidence” for this view (ibid., p. 265).
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sense]. Such mechanisms, however, could produce pathological behavior. (ibid., p. 
243)80
 
This suggests that Wakefield’s notions of function and dysfunction are not the most 
plausible notions in this context, and that the evolutionary notion of (natural) function 
needs to be replaced by some other notion of function, e.g. the notion of a Cummins-
function (see p. 66 below).81
   Wakefield (2000b) defends himself by maintaining that “the failure of a spandrel im-
plies a disorder when and only when it implies the failure of a naturally selected func-
tion” (p. 254). For example, if someone is incapable of learning to read even under opti-
mal learning conditions (a possible case of mental disorder), “we infer that there is 
something wrong with some internal neurological mechanism that, when functioning as 
designed, supports the capacity to read (although it supports reading accidentally, not 
by design)” (ibid., p. 256). This argument does not seem convincing to me, but it is hard 
to prove him wrong (or to see how one might convince him that he is wrong). But cf. 
Radovic (forthcoming). 
 
(2) The arguments in the second group purport to show that mental disorders can be 
caused by mechanisms that perform their natural functions, i.e. that are working exactly 
as designed by evolution. An example of such an argument is given by Murphy and 
Woolfolk (2000a), when they claim that disorders can be caused by mechanisms that are 
processing “pathogenic input” but are doing so according to their design (cf., pp. 244-
245). On their view, it is 
quite possible that underlying psychological mechanisms, functioning as designed, 
may give rise to deviant behavior because they are being fed, as input, pathogenic 
information that the subject acquired through idiosyncratic learning. Such behavior 
should be treated by reeducating the subject, not by assuming that some internal 
mechanism is broken. […] There is a clear and consequential distinction between a 
                                                 
80 Nordenfelt (2003) refers to this argument as the argument from exaptation. This argument “says that
there are several human functions (in the intuitive sense of function) which have never been selected in 
the evolutionary sense. This holds, in particular, for some of our advanced mental functions, such as 
reading, writing, or calculating. A disability with regard to such functions is normally regarded as a 
disorder or disease. However, since these are failures with regard to exaptations and not with regard to 
natural functions they do not fulfill Wakefield’s criterion of diseasehood.” The other argument offered 
by Nordenfelt is “the argument from free riders”, which says that “there are several organs present in 
existing organisms today which have never been selected in the evolutionary sense. According to the 
definition of natural function these organs cannot have natural functions. Thus, they cannot be disor-
dered. This is a counterintuitive conclusion.” (These two quotations are both from Nordenfelt’s own 
summary of the 2003 article, formulated in private communication.)
81 It is worth noting that the first dysfunction view (see pp. 58-59 above) cannot be criticized in this 
manner.
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broken mechanism and a functioning mechanism operating over deviant input. 
Wakefield’s analysis obscures this distinction. (p. 245) 82
 
 As it stands, this is not a very convincing argument. First, it seems to assume that dys-
functions are broken mechanisms. This is not true, however. For a dysfunction to be 
present, it is sufficient if some mechanism fails to do what it is designed to do. Second, 
the fact that a mental disorder is “a result of problematic social learning”, that it is “ac-
quired through normally operating mechanisms of learning and conditioning” (ibid., p. 
245), does not mean that there is no dysfunction present. Injuries due to external trauma 
are obviously disorders that involve dysfunctions, and so are inflammatory reactions 
and infectious diseases due to invasions of noxious agents. There are mental injuries of 
this type as well, e.g. posttraumatic stress disorder. 
   However, the fact that some mental disorders are not just acquired by “learning”, but 
that they can also be treated by psychotherapy, suggests that there is really no mental 
dysfunction involved in these cases. The difference between the phobic and the non-
phobic is most probably not that there is some specific mechanism that is malfunction-
ing in the one case but that is functioning as designed in the other. Instead, it seems 
more reasonable to assume that the difference between the phobic and the non-phobic is 
simply that they function in different ways, where “the phobic way of functioning” is far 
more harmful than the non-phobic way. Or consider the personality disorders. As 
Kendell (2002) points out, personality disorders are often “distinguished from mental 
illness by their enduring, potentially life-long nature and by the assumption that they 
represent extremes of normal variation83 rather than a morbid process of some kind.” 
(p. 111) Kendell also points out that this idea is, in part, due to the fact that “as yet little 
is known of the underlying mechanisms of which they [the personality disorders] are a 
manifestation” (ibid., p. 113). All this suggests that personality disorders do not involve 
                                                 
82 Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) also present another argument of type (2), viz. the idea that disorders
can be caused by mechanisms working as designed by evolution in circumstances they were not de-
signed to be in. On their view, “disordered behavior in our modern environment is a poor guide to un-
derlying dysfunction. […] The environment in which selection pressures acted so as to leave us with 
our current mental endowment is not the one we inhabit now. For any mental mechanism producing 
harmful behavior in the contemporary world, it may be that the mechanism is fulfilling its design speci-
fications to the letter, but the environment is not one in which the design promotes well-being.” (p. 244)
They also add that mental disorders characterized by fear and avoidance are possible examples of such 
“environment-design mismatches”. Against this, Wakefield (2000b) argues that “it is just not true that
when we believe that the way we are designed has become problematic due to new environmental con-
ditions, we consider the problem a disorder. For example, […] [w]e are designed with a ‘fight or flight’ 
reaction to threat, and this reaction is apparently harmful in the modern world of constant human com-
petition and stress […], but this reaction is not considered a disorder.” (p. 258) According to Wakefield, 
Murphy and Woolfolk “take it as obvious that such undesirable mismatches are disorders, which begs 
the question.” (ibid., p. 259) In my view, this is a convincing piece of defense. 
83 Or alternatively put, “[t]he behaviours and attitudes that define personality disorders are probably
graded traits present to a lesser degree in many other people” (ibid., p. 112). 
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dysfunctions (e.g. in Wakefield’s evolutionary sense). That is, it seems that if we con-
ceive of the personality disorders as mental disorders, then we have to reject this type of 
dysfunction view.84 In short, it seems that we can’t assume that all mental disorders in-
volve “failing functions”, or “sub-par functioning”. In some cases, it makes more sense 
to speak of different ways of functioning rather than different degrees of functioning. 
   It is of course possible to defend oneself against this criticism by simply insisting that 
e.g. conditions acquired through normal learning processes can only be regarded as dis-
orders when they involve dysfunctions. However, it seems that one has to pay a consid-
erable price for doing so. Consider the following line of reasoning in Wakefield 2000b: 
[I]f a repressed sense of loss from early in life leads to rigidly fixed unconscious be-
liefs that consistently cause one to greatly overinterpret routine losses, then there is 
a failure of function of the loss-assessment mechanism that provides input to the 
sadness response, even if the beliefs were originally attained through normal learn-
ing processes. (p. 263) 
 
In order to save the idea that “whenever there is a disorder, there simply has to be a 
dysfunction”, Wakefield has to postulate “loss-assessment mechanisms” and other 
strange mental mechanisms. It is not just that this sounds like a dubious form of faculty 
psychology, it is also somewhat doubtful that all the mechanisms (faculties) that need to 
be introduced to save the idea are naturally selected. 
 
Is any essentialist dysfunction view plausible? 
In short, it seems that Wakefield’s evolutionary notion of dysfunction is somewhat prob-
lematic, and so is the concept of mental disorder that is (so to speak) based on it.85 Is 
                                                 
84 However, it can be doubted whether personality disorders should be regarded as mental disorders,
and not just because they might not involve dysfunctions. For example, we might want to exclude them
from the category “mental disorder” because they are too unlike somatic disorders, because they can or 
should not be managed by the health care system, or because people with personality disorders do not 
deserve to be accorded the priviliges of the ’sick role’. Another way in which the dysfunction view
might be defended is by questioning the idea that personality disorder can be sharply distinguished
from “mental illness”. According to Kendell (2002), the idea that personality disorders are enduring
conditions that represent extremes of normal variation, whereas mental illnesses are morbid processes,
”appear increasingly questionable, and as a result the distinction between illness and personality disor-
der is starting to break down” (p. 113). For example, ”[s]ome schizophrenic illnesses have the same
time course as personality disorder”, and ”it is becoming increasingly clear that the genetic bases of 
affective personality disorders and mood disorders, and of schizotypal personality disorder and schizo-
phrenia, have much in common” (ibid., p. 113).
85 There are two types of problems with Wakefield’s definition of “mental disorder”: those related to
the idea that harm is necessary for disorder, and those associated with the idea that dysfunction (in the
evolutionary sense) is necessary for disorder. The idea that dysfunction is necessary for disorder suffers
from several weaknesses. It doesn’t just fail to satisfy the ordinary language condition (malfunctioning
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there any reason to believe that we can ever come up with an essentialist and value-free 
notion of dysfunction that is also necessary for disorder? There are several reasons for 
doubting that all disorders (by definition) involve objectively establishable dysfunctions, 
at least if we do not deviate totally from our present psychiatric classification systems, 
where e.g. phobias and personality disorders are classified as mental disorders. 
   First, the dysfunction theory implies that if no underlying pathology has been (objec-
tively) identified, we can’t really know whether a certain condition is a disorder. This is 
rather counterintuitive, however. 
   Second, the idea that some mental disorders are best conceived of as examples of 
harmful internal functioning rather than as harmful dysfunctions is not just an objection to 
Wakefield’s evolutionary theory of disorder, but to all essentialist or scientific dysfunc-
tion views of disorder. These theories assume that all conditions properly classified as 
mental disorders have the same type of internal cause, and that this type is (roughly) a 
natural kind, a class that exists “out there” in nature. This seems to imply that the class 
of mental disorder is quite homogeneous, that all mental disorders are “the same kind of 
thing”, i.e. that they belong to the same ontological category. It is likely, however, that 
the different mental disorders (as they are commonly defined) do not belong to the same 
ontological category. As May et al (2002) point out, it is possible “that the nature of psy-
chopathology is intrinsically heterogeneous [i.e. that the simplicity condition cannot be 
satisfied] consisting in part of true disease entities and in part of reaction types or mal-
adaptive response patterns.” (p. x)86 In short, it seems that some of the disorders listed 
in DSM are diseases, whereas other diagnostic rubrics refer to ontological categories like 
syndromes (in the medical sense), isolated symptoms, habitual patterns of behaviour, 
subjective experiences, and personality traits.87 If we accept this heterogeneous picture 
as valid (e.g. because it satisfies the ordinary language condition and the condition of 
normative adequacy to a high degree), it seems hard to maintain the view that all disor-
ders have the same type of internal cause, viz. that they are all caused by some mental 
dysfunction. 
                                                                                                                                                              
spandrels do not qualify as disorders) and the reliability condition (it is very hard to determine whether 
or not a dysfunction is present), it also fails to satisfy e.g. the condition of normative adequacy (if we 
think that a condition should not be treated unless it is a disorder, it suggests that malfunctioning span-
drels should not be treated). 
86 For example, it is possible that bipolar disorder is a “disease arising from a defect in the brain ma-
chinery”, whereas some of the anxiety disorders rather “arise from a dysregulation of defenses” (ibid., 
p. x). 
87 According to Jablensky and Kendell (2002), “[t]he term ‘disorder’, first introduced as a generic
name for the unit of classification in DSM-I in 1952, has no clear correspondence with either the con-
cept of disease or the concept of syndrome in medical classifications. It conveniently circumvents the 
problem that the material from which most of the diagnostic rubrics are constructed consists primarily 
of reported subjective experiences and patterns of behavior. Some of those rubrics correspond to syn-
dromes in the medical sense, but many appear to be sub-syndromal and reflect isolated symptoms, ha-
bitual behaviours, or personality traits.” (p. 6) 
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   To sum up, the traditional medical (essentialist) dysfunction analysis of disorder is 
problematic for several reasons – mainly because it is inconsistent with ordinary lan-
guage and because it fails to satisfy the condition of normative adequacy – and it should 
therefore be rejected. Look us now look at some alternatives, i.e. some other attempts to 
capture the relevant kind of internal cause. 
 
3. Other dysfunction alternatives 
Before we reject all kinds of dysfunction views, we have to ask ourselves whether there 
is any alternative notion of dysfunction that is more plausible in this context. What we 
want to know is whether it is possible to define the concept of dysfunction without any 
reference to evolution or biological disadvantage, and in a way that permits us to say 
that e.g. spandrels have functions. 
   An example of such a definition is the one offered by Cummins in 1975. On this view, 
a function is (roughly) a causal role in a system: The function of a certain structure or 
mechanism is the causal contribution it makes to the overall operation of the system that 
contains it, i.e. a certain structure has a “Cummins-function” if it contributes to the op-
eration of the overall system. So, can the notion of Cummins-function be of any use in 
this context, i.e. can it give us a notion of mental dysfunction that can help us distin-
guish between disorder and non-disorder? Well, it certainly seems preferable to Wake-
field’s evolutionary notion of dysfunction, mainly because it has the advantage of not 
presupposing that we can discriminate mental adaptations from e.g. mental spandrels 
and exaptations in order to apply the concept of dysfunction correctly: they all have 
Cummins-functions (cf. Murphy and Woolfolk 2000b). 
   It is not likely that this concept of function can be applied without value judgments, 
however. To determine whether a certain mechanism has a function in this sense, and 
what this function is, we have to determine how it contributes to the operation of the 
overall system. Now, this is only possible if we have some idea of what the system and 
its goals are, and this can hardly be determined in an objective way.88 As Murphy and 
Woolfolk (2000b) put it, “[t]he background context of inquiry, what makes the concept 
of proper functioning or dysfunction within a Cummins functional system intelligible at 
all, is laden with human interests from the very beginning” (p. 283). In short, it seems 
that we have to rely on value judgements in order to identify a dysfunction in a Cum-
mins function, e.g. to determine the failure of a spandrel. 
                                                 
88 In physiological contexts, there are exceptions to this rule, e.g. the goal of the temperature regulation
system can clearly be determined objectively. At this point, it might be argued that survival and repro-
duction are the obvious goals of biological systems, but as far as I can see, this is a somewhat arbitrary
choice. Moreover, we have already seen on pp. 58-59 above that this suggestion does not help us to 
come up with a reasonable definition of “disorder”.
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   Megone’s (2000) “Aristotelean” notion of dysfunction is an example of such a Cum-
mins-type of view. According to Megone, “the ultimate goal for a good human being” 
(“the human function”) is “to live the life of a fully rational animal” (p. 49). After having 
identified “the function of the whole” in this way, he can then maintain that “[t]he func-
tion of the bodily and mental parts of a human is to operate in ways which contribute 
instrumentally or constitutively to the realization of” this goal (ibid., p. 49). Illness, 
“whether bodily or mental”, can then be analyzed as “an incapacitating failure of bodily 
or mental capacities, respectively, to realize their functions” (ibid., p. 49), or alterna-
tively, as an “incapacitating failure to realize (actualize)” a fully rational life (ibid., p. 
56).  
   Is this a plausible notion of mental dysfunction, i.e. can it help us to draw the line be-
tween mental disorders and other conditions in a reasonable way? Well, this seems to 
depend on how the goal state is specified, and this is not just because some possible 
specifications of goal states give rise to definitions that fail to satisfy the value condition. 
It is also quite hard to identify the relevant “part functions” and “dysfunctions”, regard-
less of what the goal state is. For example, a definition which is based on the assumption 
that the goal state is “a fully rational life” is probably lacking in precision as well as in 
reliability, but the same thing seems to hold for a definition based on the assumption 
that the goal state is “to be able to realize one’s vital goals” (see p. 68 below). The plau-
sibility of this analysis also depends on how well it deals with the group (2) arguments 
on pp. 62-64 above. As far as I can see, these arguments are not much of a threat to the 
Cummins-type of dysfunction view. On the other hand, this suggests that there is little 
or no difference between this view and the idea that disorders are simply harmful con-
ditions caused by internal states or processes. That is, to keep things simple, it seems 
that we might just drop the notion of dysfunction altogether. To see if this is so, let us 
now take a closer look at the idea that any internal cause will do. 
 
4. The modern medical model: Any internal cause 
We have seen that the traditional medical dysfunction view is most probably too nar-
row. For example, if dysfunction (defined in evolutionary terms) is regarded as neces-
sary for disorder, this seems to exclude too many consensual disorders from the cate-
gory of disorder. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that if someone has a mental 
disorder, this means that something has gone wrong with the person. So the question 
arises: How should we specify the central notion of “going wrong”, now that we can no 
longer appeal to dysfunctions? Well, we have seen that the appeal to failed Cummins-
functions is one possibility. A very similar suggestion is the idea that any internal cause 
will do, or more specifically, that any type of internal cause will do. 
   On this type of view (adopted by e.g. Nordenfelt, Pörn, Reznek, Whitbeck, and Sedg-
weck), diseases and other disorders are, by definition, internal conditions that tend to 
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compromise people’s health, where “health” is, as a rule, defined in terms of functional 
ability. Or alternatively put, a disorder is an internal state or process that tends to give 
rise “illness”, defined in terms of incapacitation or disability. Nordenfelt's (1995) defini-
tion of malady (an umbrella term for diseases, impairments, injuries and defects, i.e. 
disorder) is a good example of this type of view. According to Nordenfelt, “M is a type 
of malady in environment E if, and only if, M is an episode-type [physical or mental] 
which, when instanced in a person A in E, causes with high probability illness in A” (p. 
149), where a person A is ill if and only if A is, in standard circumstances, disabled from 
realizing his vital goals.89
   The main reason why Nordenfelt and others put so much emphasis on types is that it 
allows for the possibility that there are disorder-instances (e.g. undetected cancer) that 
do not affect the health of a person. To think in terms of types rather than in terms of 
instances is also crucial if we want to come up with a plausible distinction between men-
tal disorder and somatic disorder. What makes a disorder mental is supposedly that it is 
caused by some mental factor (cf. p. 52 above).90 And since it may well be the case that 
all mental episodes are identical with episodes in the brain, the only plausible way of 
distinguishing bodily from mental illness is, as Svensson (1990) suggests, “by way of 
dividing the types of internal factors that cause the illness into physical and mental” (p. 
108, my italics). 
   If we replace the idea that disorders, by definition, tend to give rise to incapacitation 
with the more “generous” idea that a disorder is, by definition, harmful (cf. pp. 32-34 
above), we get the following definition of “mental disorder”: A mental disorder (token) 
is a type of condition that tends to give rise to harm, and that is caused by some internal 
episode of a mental type. That is, the relevant internal cause is of a mental type, and it is 
of a type such that most or all instances of this type cause harm (e.g. disability). On this 
view, it is not really possible to give any further specification of the kind of internal 
cause that is present when someone has a mental disorder. 
   Now, this view is obviously far more “inclusive” than the dysfunction view, at least on 
the assumption that there are many types of internal factors besides e.g. failures of natu-
rally selected mechanisms that cause harm. In fact, this “inclusive” view may well be 
over-inclusive in the sense that it seems to include a number of consensual non-
disorders in the category of disorder, e.g. conditions like ignorance, fanatical beliefs, 
normal grief, or being madly and unhappily in love. If Nordenfelt and others think that 
these conditions should not be regarded as mental disorders, they have to explain why, 
                                                 
89 The concept of disease is defined as follows: “D is a disease-type in environment E if, and only if, D
is a type of physical or mental process which, when instanced in a person P in E, would with high prob-
ability cause illness in P.” (p. 108) That is, what distinguishes diseases from other maladies is, on this 
view, that they are processes.
90 But again, cf. footnote 94 on p. 71 below.
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i.e. they have to show us how genuine mental disorders should be distinguished from 
other mental incapacity-producing conditions. As Svensson (1990) puts it, 
[b]y making consequences on the whole-person-capacity level the defining charac-
teristics of disease, this approach seems to run into difficulties in separating ‘mental 
diseases’ from other mental, illness-producing, circumstances. […] [T]he characteri-
zation of disease in terms of illness-producing circumstances is not sufficient to de-
lineate a mental-disease category, unless we would want to expand this category to 
include a variety of mental incapacity-producing circumstances that we do not or-
dinarily view as in any way pathological. (p. 117) 
 
It is hard to see on what grounds a theorist of this type can argue that e.g. fanatical be-
liefs or unhappy love are not disorders. It is of course possible to refer to what is consid-
ered normal in the culture in which the condition appears, but this would really turn it 
into another theory, which includes a new evaluative element. Another possibility is to 
argue that e.g. ignorance or fanatical beliefs are only harmful in certain environments, 
and that they should therefore be conceived of as suboptimal behaviours (or the like) 
rather than as disorders. However, this strategy cannot explain why conditions like un-
happy love or “normal grief” should not be regarded as pathological. 
   Another difficulty that the “any internal cause” theorist has to deal with is how to dis-
tinguish the internal from external, or more specifically, how to determine whether a 
certain incapacitating condition is caused by internal factors or whether it is “merely” a 
reaction to environmental factors. For example, it seems pretty clear to me that almost 
every painful emotion is caused by a combination of internal and external factors, and 
that the immediate (proximate) cause is normally internal, viz. that the subject interprets 
and evaluates the external situation the way he does. This is as true in the case of grief 
(which we tend to regard as non-pathological) as it is in the case of phobic reactions 
(which we tend to regard as pathological). Now, if the “internal cause” theorist agrees 
with the idea that phobic reactions are pathological whereas “normal grief” is not, he 
has to explain why we should only think of the phobic reaction as internally caused. In 
short, he has to distinguish internally caused conditions from externally caused condi-
tions in a way that works in this context, i.e. helps us to delineate the concept of mental 
disorder.91 (It is worth noting that dysfunction theories never encounter this type of 
problem.) One possibility here is to appeal to some evaluative standard of normality, 
and to claim that the grieving of a loved one is externally caused because it is a “nor-
                                                 
91 Here is another difficult case. Suppose that someone repeatedly finds himself in a certain (external)
situation because of his personality traits. Suppose also that the situation he is in (e.g. a situation char-
acterized by loneliness and unemployment) causes him to suffer, and that this situation would be pain-
ful to almost everyone. Should we regard his distress as internally or externally caused (in the relevant 
sense)?
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mal” and “intelligible” reaction, whereas intense anxiety in the presence of a dog is in-
ternally caused because it is “abnormal” or “unintelligible”. This strategy is not really 
open to the “internal cause” theorist qua “internal cause” theorist, however, since it 
would (again) turn his theory into a different theory, a theory with an additional evalua-
tive element. (There is a promising strategy that we will soon look at, however, viz. the 
idea that a condition is internally caused if it has no distinct sustaining cause.) 
   In short, the idea that a harmful condition is a mental disorder if it is caused by some 
kind (any kind) of internal mental factor is quite problematic. It fails to satisfy the ordi-
nary language condition by being overly inclusive, and it probably fails to satisfy the 
condition of normative adequacy for the same reason. For example, if conditions like 
normal grief and unhappy love are regarded as pathological, we get little guidance from 
the idea that people who suffer from mental disorders are entitled to health care or 
compensation. Moreover, it is not quite clear how we should distinguish those condi-
tions which are internally caused from those that are externally caused, and the defini-
tion is therefore lacking in precision as well as in reliability. It can also be argued that 
there is something resigned about this type of analysis, e.g. compared to Wakefield and 
others, who are at least trying to say something substantial about the factual component 
of the concept of disorder. Is it really impossible to say more about what makes a condi-
tion a disorder than that it is harmful and internally caused (in some vague sense)? Well, 
it is at least possible to define “internal cause” in an interesting way, viz. in terms of the 
absence of a distinct sustaining cause. Let us now take a closer look at this idea. 
 
5. Culver and Gert: No distinct sustaining cause 
Culver and Gert (1982) share the general view that disorders are (roughly) internally 
caused harmful conditions. To clarify this view, they specify the phrase “internally 
caused” in terms of the absence of a distinct sustaining cause: 
We could say that to be a malady, the evil-producing condition must be part of the 
person. However, for reasons of conceptual rigor, a more formal negative statement 
is preferable: the person has a malady if and only if the evil he is suffering does not 
have a sustaining cause which is clearly distinct from the person. (p. 72)92
 
The notion of a distinct sustaining cause is defined as follows: X is a distinct sustaining 
cause of a condition C if and only if (a) X is a cause of C; (b) X is not part of the person 
with C, i.e. it is distinct from this person; and (c) if X were removed, C would cease to 
                                                 
92 As I see it, this idea is closely related to Reznek’s idea that diseases are, by definition, involuntary
conditions which cannot be eliminated by a decision, and that we are (therefore) not immediately re-
sponsible for our disorders. On the assumption that distinct sustaining causes are normally possible to 
eliminate, that is. 
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exist almost immediately, i.e. X is necessary for sustaining C 93(cf. Wilkinson 2000, p. 
301). That is, the idea is that if a condition has a distinct sustaining cause, then it is ex-
ternally caused (in the relevant sense), and it cannot be a malady (disorder). This is not 
to deny that a malady may have been caused originally by factors distinct from the per-
son. The important thing is that to be a malady, a condition is not now “in a state of con-
tinuing dependence on those [external] factors; rather, it is present even in their ab-
sence” (Culver and Gert 1982., p. 72). 
   Is this a plausible view, i.e. is it reasonable to regard maladies (disorders) as harmful 
conditions that are “not in continuing dependence upon causes clearly distinct from 
oneself”? Well, on the face of it, this view certainly seems preferable to the vaguer “in-
ternal cause” view that we have just looked at. However, it is worth noting that Culver 
and Gert’s analysis does not help us to distinguish those internal causes that are mental 
from those that are physical, and that we therefore (to some extent) have to rely on our 
intuitions to separate the mental disorders from the physical ones.94
   So, is this analysis reasonable? Suppose that someone has a phobic reaction (a panic 
attack) in the presence of a dog. Suppose also that the anxiety would disappear almost 
immediately if the dog were removed. This suggests that the phobic reaction is not 
really a disorder, which is counterintuitive. At this point, it might be objected that there 
is more to phobia than panic attacks in the presence of the feared object, viz. that it es-
sentially involves a kind of involuntary “avoidance behaviour” which tends to have dis-
ruptive effects on life. This behaviour is not sustained by any distinct cause, however, 
and the same thing holds for the volitional disability associated with it. Thus, phobia 
cannot really be regarded as a counter-example to Culver and Gert’s analysis after all. 
However, as Culver and Gert themselves observe, even though phobias are “frequently 
associated with intentional unvoluntary [sic] behavior” (ibid., p. 119), these conditions 
“do not always involve a volitional disability; they sometimes involve only the suffering 
of inappropriate anxiety” (ibid., p. 111). Or more specifically, “only the irrational fear is 
                                                 
93 In Culver and Gert’s (1982) own words, a sustaining cause is “a cause whose effects come and go
simultaneously (or nearly so) with its respective presence and absence” (p. 72). 
94 On the assumption that it is not the kind of symptoms that makes a disorder mental, that is, but the
type of internal factor (underlying pathology) that gives rise to the condition (cf. p. 52 above). Culver 
and Gert (1982) reject this idea, however, and they therefore feel no need to distinguish between differ-
ent types of internal causes. On their view, “[m]ental maladies are distinguished from physical maladies 
primarily by the types of symptoms or evils that characterize them. Though etiology plays some role, as
does the type of treatment that is effective in relieving the symptoms or curing the malady, it is the 
dominant symptoms that play the largest role in determining whether we regard a person as having a
physical or mental malady. […] Physical maladies have as their predominant symptoms physical pain 
and physical disability. […] Mental maladies are maladies in which the evil(s) being suffered are pri-
marily mental pain and mental disability. Mental disability includes both cognitive and volitional dis-
ability.” (p. 88) 
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necessary, not any actual avoidance behavior” (ibid., p. 120).95 This suggests that phobia 
constitutes a counter-example after all, i.e. that there are disorders that are sustained by 
distinct causes. (It is rather obvious that the phobic disposition does not have a distinct 
sustaining cause, however.)96
   Now, consider the case where someone is distressed or incapacitated because of his 
fanatical religious beliefs, e.g. because these beliefs don’t really allow him to live “a 
normal life”. If we conceive of a person’s beliefs as an integrated part of this person,97 
this suggests that the religious fanatic suffers from a mental disorder, which might also 
be regarded as somewhat counterintuitive. On the other hand, it might be argued that 
fanatical beliefs are best regarded as “viruses of the mind”, and that they should there-
fore be classified as mental disorders.98
   A third type of case that might be problematic for Culver and Gert is an incapacitating 
condition like severe (but “normal”) grief. Suppose someone is grieving because he just 
lost a loved one. Does this condition have a distinct sustaining cause? Well, it seems that 
the sustaining cause of the grief is really the person’s belief that he has lost someone he 
loves. So, is this belief distinct from the person? Well, if it is not, this would suggest that 
“normal grief” is a disorder (contrary to what Culver and Gert themselves think). How-
ever, it might be argued that the belief in question is sustained by the state of the world, 
viz. the fact that the loved one is gone. That is, if the world would change and the loved 
one would return, the grief would disappear, which suggests that grief is not a disorder 
after all. As Wilkinson (2000) points out, it is somewhat strange way to think of eternal 
facts as sustaining causes, however. If we want to regard the grief (and the belief) as ex-
ternally caused, it seems far more plausible to regard the loss (i.e. the concrete event) as 
the cause, and although this cause is clearly distinct, it can hardly be regarded as sus-
taining. In short, it seems that Culver and Gert’s analysis imply that normal grief is a 
mental disorder after all, which might be linguistically counterintuitive to many of us. A 
concept of mental disorder that implies that grief is a disorder might also be considered 
less normatively adequate than a concept that does not have this implication. 
                                                 
95 For example, “[i]t is possible for someone with claustrophobia to feel great anxiety when the situa-
tion requires him to enter an elevator, but to enter it in spite of the anxiety. In this case, the phobia is a 
mental malady [disorder] because of the intense, inappropriate anxiety, but it does not involve a voli-
tional disability” (ibid., p. 120).
96 Another possible example of a condition that is best regarded as disorder even though it is sustained
by a distinct cause, is where someone is in a deeply confused condition due to sensory deprivation. It is 
not implausible to conceive of this condition as pathological. The example is Helge Malmgren’s.
97 In the somatic case, Culver and Gert suggest that e.g. poison, viruses, and germs should not be re-
garded as distinct parts of the person if they are biologically integrated (ibid., p. 73). In a similar way, it 
can be argued that a person’s beliefs are parts of this person if they are “mentally integrated”, e.g. if it is 
hard for the person to give them up. 
98 The suggestion is Frank Lorentzon’s.
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   To conclude, it seems reasonable to assume that as a rule, those conditions that are 
dependent on some continuing environmental state are not disorders. For example, it is 
generally the case that the course of a disease is relatively independent of external influ-
ences. However, Culver and Gert do not draw the line between the pathological and the 
non-pathological where most people intuitively want to draw it. Their theory might be 
considered too exclusive and too inclusive at the same time, e.g. because it seems to im-
ply that “normal grief” and fanatical beliefs should be classified as disorders, whereas 
panic attacks should be excluded from the category of mental disorder. That is, the the-
ory does not fully satisfy the ordinary language condition. To some extent, it also fails to 
help us decide e.g. who is entitled to health care or compensation, at least if we assume 
that e.g. phobics are entitled to health care whereas e.g. religious fanatics are not. It is 




We can now summarize the chapter on the factual component of “mental disorder” (i.e. 
on what kind of internal cause that is “essentially” involved in mental disorder) as fol-
lows: 
 
(A) Wakefield’s idea that disorders are, by definition, caused by mental dysfunctions 
(defined in evolutionary terms) is a well-founded theory, but it tends to exclude some 
consensual disorders from the category of mental disorder. 
 
(B) The most promising alternatives to the scientific type of dysfunction analysis are (i) 
the idea that a mental disorder is an undesirable (e.g. harmful) condition caused by a 
dysfunction in a mental Cummins-function, and (ii) the idea that a mental disorder is a 
harmful condition that are caused by some kind of mental internal episode, where this is 
taken to imply that the condition does not have a distinct sustaining cause. 
   Both these ideas suffer from certain weaknesses, however. For example, (i) presup-
poses that we can conceive of the mental apparatus as a “Cummins functional system” 
and that we can attribute some goal or goals to this system. The main problem with (ii) 
is rather that it tends to include some more or less consensual non-disorders (e.g. “nor-
mal grief”, fanatical beliefs, and unrequited love or infatuation) in the category of men-
tal disorder. 
 
(C) In my view, this strongly suggests that the different desiderata for a good definition 
(cf. pp. 18-23 above) are pulling in different directions. For example, it seems that if we 
rely on our linguistic intuitions (i.e. if we give considerable weight to the ordinary lan-
guage condition), then we probably have to give up the idea that “mental disorder” can 
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be defined in terms of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient (e.g. we have to 
sacrifice the theory condition and the simplicity condition). In fact, it seems likely that if 
we want to capture the concept of mental disorder as it is actually used in everyday 
speech, we should probably settle for some kind of family resemblance analysis or pro-
totype analysis. 
 
This observation is highly consistent with one of the main conclusions of chapter three, 
which concerned the evaluative component of “mental disorder”. One of the basic as-
sumptions in this essay is the idea that mental disorders as undesirable conditions that 
are caused by internal mental factors. On this view, the concept of mental disorder does 
not just have a factual (or explanatory) component – a condition can, by definition, not 
be a disorder unless it has the right kind of internal immediate or proximate – but also 
an evaluative component – a disorder is, by definition, undesirable. In chapter three, we 
saw that the evaluations we have to rely on to distinguish the pathological from the 
non-pathological are mainly of the form “this condition is harmful for the person”. We 
also saw that if we want to specify the class of mental disorder in a way that is consis-
tent with ordinary language, we also need to make use of other kinds of evaluations, 
viz. judgements about what is harmful for others and judgements about abnormal func-
tioning. That is, the idea that several kinds of evaluations are relevant in this context is 
more in line with ordinary language than e.g. the idea that considerations of harm are 
the only relevant kind of evaluation. However, the latter idea has other advantages, e.g. 
it gives us an evaluative content of “mental disorder” that satisfies the simplicity condi-
tions and the reliability condition to a higher degree. In short, as far as the evaluative 
content of a definition is concerned, there seems to be quite a tension between e.g. the 
ordinary language, on the one hand, and e.g. the reliability and simplicity conditions, on 
the other (cf. conclusion (C) on pp. 41-42 above). 
   In short, regardless of whether we have the value component or the factual component 
in mind, we can observe that if we rely heavily on our linguistic intuitions (i.e. if we give 
considerable weight to the ordinary language condition), then we most probably have to 
give up the idea that “mental disorder” can be defined in terms of necessary conditions 
that are jointly sufficient, and settle for e.g. some sort of family resemblance analysis 
instead. However, we might also give less weight to the ordinary language condition, 
e.g. because we want a coherent and precise concept or because we want a concept that 
is normatively relevant to a high degree. 
   As far as the evaluative component is concerned, there is (in my view) only one way to 
go if we decide to put less emphasis on our linguistic intuitions, viz. “the way of harm”. 
That is, we simply have to accept the idea that considerations of harm are the only kind 
of evaluation we have to rely on to distinguish the pathological from the non-
pathological. Concerning the factual component of the concept, there are (as far as I can 
see) two possible ways to go if we decide to give less weight to the ordinary language 
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condition, viz. “the scientific way” (e.g. to develop the dysfunction view further) or “the 
holistic way” (e.g. to improve on the idea that a mental disorder is a harmful condition 
that does not have a distinct sustaining cause). The first approach would probably give 
us a more narrow concept of disorder of high normative relevance, while the second 
approach would probably give us a broader and more generous concept that is of less 
normative relevance. As far as I can see, these alternative approaches are just as respect-
able as “the ordinary language approach”, probably even more so. 




American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders, 4th edition (DSM-IV). Washington, DC: APA. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders, 4th ed., text revision (DSM-IV-TR). Washington, DC: APA. 
Blackburn S. (1994). The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Block N. (ed.). Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1-2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980-81. 
Boorse C. (1975). On the distinction between disease and illness. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 5: 49-68. 
Boorse C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44: 542–573. 
Brülde B. (2000a). On How to Define the Concept of Health: A Loose Comparative Ap-
proach. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 3: 305-308. 
Brülde B. (2000b). More on the looser comparative approach to defining ‘health’: A reply 
to Nordenfelt’s reply. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 3: 313-315. 
Brülde B. and Tengland P-A. (2003). Hälsa och sjukdom – en begreppslig utredning. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Culver C.M. and Gert B. (1982). Philosophy in Medicine. Conceptual and Ethical Issues in 
Medicine and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dennett D.C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Hacking I. (1995). Rewriting the Soul. Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hacking I. (1999). The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Jablensky A. and Kendell R.E. (2002). Criteria for Assessing a Classification in Psychia-
try. In: Maj et al (eds.). Psychiatric Diagnosis and Classification. Chichester: John Wiley, 
1-24. 
 76
Kendell R.E. (1975). The concept of disease and its implications for psychiatry. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 127: 305-315. 
Kendell R.E. (2002). The Distinction between Personality Disorder and Mental Illness. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 180: 110-115. 
Lilienfeld S.O. and Marino L. (1995). Mental disorder as a Roschian concept: a critique of 
Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction” analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104: 411-
420. 
Maj M., Gaebel W., López-Ibor J.J., and Sartorius N. (eds.) (2002). Psychiatric Diagnosis 
and Classification. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Malmgren H. (1984). Några reflexioner kring sjukdomsbegreppet. Göteborg: Filosofiska insti-
tutionen. 
Megone C. (2000). Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, 
and Psychology, 7: 45-65. 
Murphy D. and Woolfolk R.L. (2000a). The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental 
Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, Vol. 7, No 4, December 2000, pp. 
241-252. 
Murphy D. and Woolfolk R.L. (2000b). Conceptual Analysis versus Scientific Under-
standing: An Assessment of Wakefield’s Folk Psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and 
Psychology, 7: 271-292. 
Nettleton S. (1995). The Sociology of Health and Illness. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Nordenfelt L. (1995). On the Nature of Health. An Action-Theoretic Approach, 2nd revised 
edition. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Nordenfelt L. (2003). On the Evolutionary Concept of Health. Health as Natural Func-
tion. In: Nordenfelt L. and Liss P-E. (eds.). Dimensions of Health and Health Promotion. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi Press. 
Pilgrim D. (2002). Personality Disorder (Correspondence). British Journal of Psychiatry 
(2002), 181: 77-78. 
Radovic F. (forthcoming). Natural functions. (working title) 
Reznek L. (1987) The Nature of Disease. London: Routledge. 
Scadding J.G. 1967. Diagnostics: the clinician and the computer. Lancet, ii: 877–882. 
 77  
Sedgewick P. (1981). Illness – Mental and Otherwise. In: Caplan S.L., Engelhardt H.T., 
and McCartney J. J. (eds.). Concepts of Health and Disease: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 119-129. 
SOU 2002:3. Psykisk störning, brott och ansvar. Betänkande av Psykansvarskommittén. 
Stich S.P. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Svensson T. (1990). On the notion of mental illness: Problematizing the medical-model concep-
tion of certain abnormal behaviour and mental afflictions. Linköping: Linköping Studies 
in Arts and Science, 54. 
Szasz T. (2000): Second Commentary on “Aristotle’s Function Argument”. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7: 3-16. 
Tännsjö T. (1999). Coercive Care. The ethics of choice in health and medicine. London: 
Routledge. 
Üstün T. B., Chatterji S. and Andrews, G. (2002). International Classifications and the 
Diagnosis of Mental Disorders: Strengths, Limitations and Future Perspectives. In: 
Maj et al (eds.). Psychiatric Diagnosis and Classification. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Wakefield J.C. (1992). The Concept of Mental Disorder. On the Boundary Between Bio-
logical Facts and Social Values. American Psychologist, 47: 373-388. 
Wakefield J.C. (2000a). Aristotle as Sociobiologist: The “Function of a Human Being” 
Argument, Black Box Essentialism, and the Concept of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7: 17-44. 
Wakefield J.C. (2000b). Spandrels, Vestigal Organs, and Such: Reply to Murphy and 
Woolfolk’s “The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder”. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7: 253-269. 
Whitbeck C. (1981). A Theory of Health. In: Caplan S.L., Engelhardt H.T., and 
McCartney J.J. (eds.). Concepts of Health and Disease: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 611–626. 




 79  
